

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA



THESIS

**THE UNITED STATES - JAPAN
TREATY RELATIONSHIP:
JAPAN'S PERSPECTIVE
ON
RENEWED U.S. COMMITMENT**

by

John M. Kubera

September, 1995

Thesis Advisor:

Claude A. Buss

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

19960220 048

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 1

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE SEPTEMBER 1995		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE THE UNITED STATES-JAPAN TREATY RELATIONSHIP: JAPAN'S PERSPECTIVE ON RENEWED U.S. COMMITMENT			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) JOHN M. KUBERA				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) With the ending of the Cold War in Europe decreasing the tensions between East and West, the United States - Japan security relationship developed after World War II has come under continuous reexamination. In order to rectify possible misperceptions as to U.S. resolve for this alliance in the Pacific, the Department of Defense has currently initiated the U.S.-Japan Security Dialogue. Although the United States and Japan security relationship has a long history throughout the Cold War, it is the recent changes in the strategic environment in Northeast Asia and the world which prompts a reassessment of Japan's own role. The issues that now influence Japan in its reassessment of its desired international role also influence its perspective towards its security relationship with the United States. The constraints placed upon Japan by its history of anti-military policies, domestic budgetary problems and present political alignment do not allow it enough freedom to take a hardline in negotiations with the United States.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS UNITED STATES, JAPAN, TREATY, SECURITY DIALOGUE, NORTHEAST ASIA SECURITY			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 113	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

**THE UNITED STATES - JAPAN TREATY RELATIONSHIP:
JAPAN'S PERSPECTIVE ON RENEWED U.S. COMMITMENT**

John M. Kubera
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., The Pennsylvania State University, 1988


Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS


from the


**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 1995**


Author:


John M. Kubera

Approved by:


Claude A. Buss, Thesis Advisor


Edward A. Olsen, Second Reader


Frank M. Teti, Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs

ABSTRACT

With the ending of the Cold War in Europe decreasing the tensions between East and West, the United States-Japan security relationship developed after World War II has come under continuous reexamination. In order to rectify possible misperceptions as to U.S. resolve for this alliance in the Pacific, the Department of Defense has currently initiated the U.S.-Japan Security Dialogue. Although the United States and Japan security relationship has a long history throughout the Cold War, it is the recent changes in the strategic environment in Northeast Asia and the world which prompts a reassessment of Japan's own role. The issues that now influence Japan in its reassessment of its desired international role also influence its perspective towards its security relationship with the United States. The constraints placed upon Japan by its history of anti-military policies, domestic budgetary problems and present political alignment do not allow it enough freedom to take a hardline in negotiations with the United States.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. JAPANESE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES: 1945 TO 1990	3
A. SACRIFICING SOVEREIGNTY FOR SURVIVAL	5
B. WESTERN AFFILIATION AND SECURITY	6
C. GREATER COMMITMENT UNDER INCREASED CONSTRAINTS	8
D. GREATER SELF-RELIANCE RESULTING FROM DECREASED U.S. COMMITMENT	13
E. EROSION OF POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS	15
III. NORTHEAST ASIA STRATEGIC SETTING	19
A. RUSSIA	21
B. CHINA	26
C. NORTH KOREA (DPRK)	29
D. SUMMARY	35
IV. REASSESSMENT OF JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL ROLE SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR	37
A. POST COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS	38
B. EFFECTS ON SECURITY POLICIES	44
C. SUMMARY	49
V. CURRENT U.S. STRATEGY AND PENDING ISSUES	53
A. U.S. STRATEGY FOR EAST ASIA AND JAPAN	55
1. Enhancement of Security	57
2. Prosperity at Home	60
B. UNITED STATES - JAPAN SECURITY DIALOGUE	61
1. Bilateral Issues	62
2. Regional and Global Issues	67

VI. CONCLUSION	71
A. AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE	71
B. JAPANESE ANTI-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE	72
C. PLAUSIBLE OUTCOME	74
APPENDIX A. TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES	77
APPENDIX B. NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM OUTLINE (NDPO)	81
LIST OF REFERENCES	83
BIBLIOGRAPHY	89
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	93

LIST OF FIGURES

1. RUSSIAN GROUND TROOPS IN THE FAR EAST	25
2. RUSSIAN NAVAL FORCES IN THE FAR EAST	25
3. RUSSIAN AIR FORCE (FIGHTERS) IN THE FAR EAST	25
4. RUSSIAN AIR FORCE (BOMBERS) IN THE FAR EAST	25
5. DPRK BALLISTIC MISSILE DEVELOPMENT	34
6. NORTH KOREAN BALLISTIC MISSILES	34
7. ECONOMIC - MILITARY COMPARISON	40

LIST OF TABLES

1. JAPAN'S DEFENSE POLICIES: 1945 TO 1990	3
2. NORTH -SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY COMPARISON	31
3. BASIC GUIDELINE FOR JAPAN'S PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING FORCE	51

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The ending of the Cold War caused a dramatic change in the strategic alignment of the world due to the sudden breakup of the Soviet Union. As East-West tensions subsided, nations became less fearful of the outbreak of a global nuclear war and focused their efforts away from international politics and towards more domestic concerns. Realist theory precludes that alliances form to balance power against a threat. In the absence of any credible threat to Western nations, the U.S.-Japan security alliance suddenly came under close scrutiny as to its relevance in this new era.

Caused by rising concerns that the U.S. interest in its security agreements with Japan were quickly decreasing, the Department of Defense initiated discussions aimed at reaffirming the security relationship between the two nations. The U.S.-Japan Security Dialogue, as it is now called, was undertaken to reexamine the relationship in all its bilateral, regional and global aspects. The United States hoped that by separating all pending issues into these distinct categories, they could facilitate concurrence and agreement between the two nations.

In order to better understand Japan's initial position in this dialogue, an investigation into its past national security policies and agreements with the United States is required. Since the ending of hostilities in 1945, the most important issue to Japan was the preservation of its "national essence." Through agreements with the United States, Japan was able to guarantee its own security through minimal effort on its own part. In order to prevent itself from becoming a military pawn similar to U.S. allies in Europe, Japan erected anti-military policies to hold American ambitions at arms length while appeasing the Japanese public. Following Japan's economic miracle of the 1960s and 1970s, Japan began to increase its military capability and bring it closer in line with its economic prowess.

Although the breakup of the Soviet Union relaxed tensions throughout the

world, Northeast Asia, although reduced, still maintains a high level of threat towards Japan. With two of its four neighbors being nuclear powers and a third, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK), being a probable nuclear power, Japan exists in one of the most potentially dangerous regions of the world. Although Russia's military budget has been succumbing to the economic problems which have devastated its country, the level of military muscle it possesses in the Far East is still significant. While most leaders believe that the unification of Korea is inevitable, Japan still observes the 'cold war' persisting on the peninsula with anxiety. The future of China, however, remains to be the largest question posed by world leaders. With all the estimates of China's economic boom continuing on into the 21st century, the corresponding modernization of its military greatly distresses Japan.

With its strategic concerns changing in the post Cold War, Japan has been reassessing its role in the new international system. The ending of the Cold War, the recent recession and the removal of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) from sole control of the government have all assisted in decreasing Japan's military spending below expected levels. Based on the present public and political mood, Japan is not prepared to undertake the social and fiscal costs associated with unilateral rearmament.

The best means for Japan to increase its international role and prestige is through participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Based on the long time in which it took the Diet to reach a consensus on guidelines for participation in PKO, it is not likely that any other relaxation of military restraints will soon be forthcoming.

In support of the U.S.-Japan Dialogue, the United States has recently released numerous documents referring to the strategic significance of Japan and U.S. resolve for continued maintenance of the alliance. While a general consensus on global and regional issues was already met, bilateral issues appear to occupy most of the

discussions.

Without unilateral rearmament or a viable substitute for the United States in the cards, Japan's best option is to accept the U.S. overall precept of increasing its commitment to the alliance, thereby subsidizing U.S. engagement in Asia.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis was possible only through the generosity of Dr. Claude A. Buss, whose direction and guidance were invaluable throughout my time in Monterey and beyond. As mentor and friend, no man could ask for anyone more inspiring and selfless. Additionally, I would like to thank Ann Rhie, whose encouragement and support greatly assisted in the completion of this thesis.

I. INTRODUCTION

With the ending of the Cold War in Europe decreasing the tensions between East and West, the United States-Japan security relationship developed after World War II has come under continuous reexamination. In the past two years relations between the two nations have been strained by disagreements on security, trade and economic issues. With security matters temporarily being pushed to the back burner by economic considerations, the U.S. Defense and State Departments have undertaken a policy initiative to reappraise security ties with Japan. In the absence of the *evil empire*, Soviet Union, many Japanese began to question the usefulness of the Mutual Security and Cooperation Treaty (MSCT) with the United States. They call for Japan to seek a larger political role in the international community which would more accurately reflect its total power and responsibilities.

On the American side, the Department of Defense came to the opinion that in order to perpetuate U.S. *leadership* in Northeast Asia, a strong and viable security arrangement with Japan would be necessary to accord the National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The backbone of the existing leadership role rested firmly on the U.S. ability to maintain military forces in the region. It was the forward deployment of troops in Japan and the use of the bases by the mutual security agreements, that allowed the United States to carry out its Cold War strategy of containment.

To bring U.S. strategy up to date, the "Nye Initiative" was undertaken to reexamine the relationship between the U.S. and Japan in all its bilateral, regional and global aspects. To be most effective, this agonizing reappraisal must not be a mere hangover of the Cold War, but must look forward to the formulation of future strategies and goals of both nations. The United States must not attempt to follow its old habits and force its agenda upon Japan as it has for the last half century. By being more considerate of Japan's own strategy in Asia, the United States will be able to foster a lesser degree of patron/client relationship for the future. This thesis will primarily focus on the appropriate roles for the United States and Japan to play. The security relationship is an essential part of the overall three legged (security, diplomacy and economic) relationship with Japan.

In determining Japan's future strategy, an analysis of its past policies concerning the security relationship with the United States will be examined. It will be found that after World War II, these policies followed distinct trends and patterns which coincided with the presence of the Cold War. It was the strategic environment emerging from the end of the Cold War that caused Japan to reassess its global role and inspired the United States to undertake its own policy initiative.

In conclusion this thesis will examine the reappraisal of strategy in the United States and its reassessment in Japan. We examine the political economic and military factors operating within each country as they influence ongoing diplomatic processes. The most plausible scenarios for the future will be suggested with appropriate recommendations for the most effective relationship.

II. JAPANESE NATIONAL SECURITY POLICIES: 1945 TO 1990

The rise of Japanese militarism and its subsequent foreign and military policies leading up to the commencement of World War II has been extensively covered by academics and scholars. Although covered just as extensively, Japan's policies since its capitulation to the United States in 1945 have not been as comprehensive and single strategy minded as those before.

In the context of the United States-Japan Security relationship, this chapter shows the evolution of Japanese policies from the end of World War II to the end of the Cold War. Particular attention will be paid to those policies, whether influenced by the U.S. or domestically generated, that have had a direct impact on the security/cooperation agreement that exists today. Japan's defense policies since the end of World War II have been separated into five categories in order to better demonstrate Japan's overall strategy. Although not all policies fall neatly into these five categories, the following outline, table (1), is provided to illustrate the general trends which have existed.

Japan's Defense Policies: 1945 to 1990

Date	Policy	Date	Policy
Sacrificing Sovereignty for Survival			
1945 Sept 2	Surrender	1947 May 3	Constitution
Western Affiliation and Security			
1949 Sept 24	USSR possession of Atomic Weapons	1951 Sept 8	U.S.-Japan Security Treaty
1950 Feb 14	Treaty of Alliance between China & USSR	1952 Feb 28	Japan-U.S. Administrative Agreement
1950	Yoshida Doctrine	Jul 26	Japan-U.S. Facilities and Areas Agreement
Jun 25	Korean War	Apr 28	Japan-Taiwan Peace Treaty
Aug 10	National Police Force (75,000 + 8,000 Marines)	Oct 15	National Security Force (formerly NPF)
1951 Sept 8	Peace Treaty	1953 July 27	Korean War ceases
Greater Commitment Under Increased Constraints			
1953 Oct 30	Ikeda-Robertson Talks	1958 Apr 18	Ban on Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs
1954 Mar 8	Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement	Oct 4	Japan-U.S. conference on revision of Security treaty commences

Jun 2	Ban on Overseas Dispatch	1960 Jan 19	Treaty of Mutual Security & Cooperation (#6) with U.S.
July 1	Defense Agency / Self Defense Forces (Defense Laws)	1963 Aug 14	Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty signed
1956 Feb 9	Ban on Atomic and Hydrogen Bomb Tests	1965 Feb 7	U.S. bombing of North Vietnam
Mar 22	Japan-U.S. Technical Agreement based on MDA	1967 Apr	Ban on Arms Exports
Oct 19	Normalized Relations with USSR	Dec	3 Non-Nuclear Principles
Dec 18	Admission to United Nations		1% Ceiling on Defense spending
1957 May20	Basic Policies for National Defense	1969 July 25	Guam (Nixon) Doctrine
Jun 14	1st Defense Buildup Plan	Nov 21	Sato-Nixon joint communiqué (extension of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, return of Okinawa to Japan's jurisdiction in 1972)
Aug 6	Japan-U.S. Security Council inaugurated		
Greater Self-Reliance Resulting from Decreased U.S. Commitment			
1970 Feb 3	NPT signed	1973 Sep 7	Sapporo District Court rules the SDF unconstitutional
Oct 20	1st Defense White Paper published	1976 Feb 2	Lockheed sales scandal
1971 Jun 29	Okinawa Defense Agreement	1976 Feb 27	Govt view on Arms Exports
1972 Feb 27	Nixon visits China (PRC)	May 24	Ratify NPT
May 15	Okinawa Returned	Jun 4	2nd Defense White Paper published (annual afterwards)
Sept 29	Formal Recognition of PRC	Oct 29	National Defense Program Outline (NDPO)
1973 Feb 1	JDA announces "Peacetime Strength"	1978 Aug 12	Treaty of Peace and Friendship with PRC
Mar 29	U.S. forces withdrawn from Vietnam	Nov 28	Japan-U.S. security Consultative Committee approves "Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation"
Erosion of Political Constraints			
1980 Jan 23	Carter Doctrine Announced	1986 Dec 30	Defense Buildup for Immediate Future
Dec 1	Ministerial Council on Security Problems established	1987 Jan 27	Abandonment of "One percent GNP Ceiling"
1981 May 8	Confirm "Alliance Relationship" (Suzuki/Reagan)	1987 Jan 30	Agreement of Japan assuming costs of Japanese labor for USFJ (eff 1 Jun 87)
1982 Sept 18	1000 mile Radius accepted	May 27	Toshiba violation of military technology export rules
1984 Feb 27	Socialist Party claims SDF unconstitutional	Sep 30	U.S. personnel housing project commenced (Ikego-Navy)
1986 Sep 5	1st transfer of military technology to U.S.	1988 Nov 19	FSX codevelopment agreement

Table 1.

A. SACRIFICING SOVEREIGNTY FOR SURVIVAL

On 2 September 1945, the Japanese government agreed to an "unconditional" surrender at the hands of the United States representing the allied powers. The surrender ended Japan's Greater East Asia War and commenced a period of demilitarization and democratization overseen by the U.S. occupation forces. To the Japanese leaders who terminated the war, the most important issue was preserving *Kokutai* or the "national essence" of Japan.¹ This being the case Japan appeased the occupying force which insisted on the destruction of all remaining military hardware and abolishment of the Army and Navy ministries, bringing Japan to a ground zero position concerning defense. The Japanese, who witnessed the division of Germany and Korea, were willing to sacrifice many areas of sovereignty to ensure the continued existence of Japan as a single nation.

On 3 May 1947, the new Japanese constitution drafted primarily by General MacArthur's staff, was enacted.² The most controversial provision of this Constitution was Article 9, the "No War" clause, which follows:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on Justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat of force as a means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the State will not be recognized.³

In conjunction with the abolishment of the Shinto State (the emperor centered government), the newly established bicameral government was to be free of military cabinet

¹Odawara Atsushi, "No Tampering with the Brake on Military Expansion," *Japan Quarterly*, v32 n3 (July-Sept 1985) 250.

²Ronald E. Dolan, ed., *Japan: A Country Study* (Washington D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1992) 60.

³Article 9 of Japanese Constitution.

members.⁴ This placed Japan's security and subsequently its military under civilian control for the first time. This appeasement by the Japanese towards their occupiers was necessary to assure the quick revitalization of a devastated country and eventual return of self-government to Japan.

At the time of its inception, these anti-militarist policies were looked upon very favorably by the international community. For the United States, however, this euphoric feeling did not last long as Article 9 later became a thorn in America's side during talks to rearm Japan.

B. WESTERN AFFILIATION AND SECURITY

Until 1948, the Japanese and U.S. leaders, content with the economic and political progress in Japan, were satisfied with the previous Potsdam formula set on punishing Japan. After the outbreak of hostilities in Korea, the allied powers sought to officially conclude a peace treaty. This normalization of relations between Japan and the rest of the international community would be the first step in reinstating full sovereignty back to Japan. The Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance, 14 February 1950, between the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), amplified the rise Communism and the influence of the cold war in Asia. As the Cold War began taking shape the United States considering building a regional defense alliance in Asia similar to NATO. In wishing to maintain a distinctive cultural identity for Japan, Prime Minister Shigera Yoshida ingeniously used the constitution to reject any alliance with other Asian nations.⁵

⁴Article 66 of Japanese Constitution.

⁵The United States envisioned this military alliance including Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and perhaps Indonesia. It was hoped that such an alliance would maintain control over the remilitarization of Japan similar to approach taken with Germany in Europe. See Ken B. Pyle, *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era*, (Washington: American Enterprise Institute [AEI], 1992) 23-24.

These externalities influenced Yoshida to be more receptive to U.S. pressure for rearmament and a security agreement. Yoshida used the U.S. desires for Japan's strategic location to obtain a militarily neutral role for Japan. By agreeing to U.S. military bases, Yoshida achieved security for Japan at no economic cost.⁶ This policy of making economic rehabilitation and industrial production a national goal, while remaining internationally neutral and unarmed under the protection of a U.S. security umbrella, later became known as the "Yoshida Doctrine."⁷

The fact that Japan would not rearm itself, made the U.S. task of selling a non-punitive peace settlement to the other allied signatories easier. The Treaty of Peace with Japan which concluded on 8 September 1951 and brought about the official end to the War in the Pacific, was followed the same day by a security agreement between the United States and Japan.⁸ The U.S.-Japan Security treaty which was basically a continuation of the

⁶During the peace treaty negotiations Yoshida agreed that Japan would raise an additional 50,000 man force for defense. This was to be separate from the 75,000 National Police Reserve which was originally organized as the nucleus of the future Japanese army. This apparently token agreement of rearmament was necessary to postpone pressure for the 300,000 man force being asked for by the U.S. delegation leaders, John F. Dulles and John M. Allison. Source: Howard B. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the remaking of Japan, 1945-1952*, (Kent: Kent State, 1989) 257-258.

⁷This grand strategy of allowing continued U.S. military presence in exchange for security assurances is clearly discussed by Kenneth B. Pyle in *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era*. The title Yoshida Doctrine, although never officially named or articulated as such, was given to this strategy decades after its inception by political leaders.

⁸At the San Francisco War Memorial Opera House, the United States hosted the "Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan" also called the "San Francisco Peace Treaty." The Soviet Union and its satellite countries, Poland and Czechoslovakia, attempted to disrupt the proceedings by proposing amendments to the draft and raising the issue of the absence of China. With the existence of two Chinese governments, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC), the United States desired to avoid the international quagmire by not inviting either party. The Peace Treaty became effective after ratification on April 28, 1952. Source: Shigeru Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis* (Cambridge: Riverside, 1962) 255.

occupation of Japan by U.S. forces, was accepted by Yoshida in order to ensure the continuation of his neomercantile strategy.

As Japan benefited economically from the Korean War by fulfilling many U.S. procurement requirements, Yoshida continued to fend off calls by the United States to rearm. By 1952, Japan and the United States began formalizing their security relationship. The Mutual Security Assistance Pact of 1952, which paved the way for U.S. military weapons, equipment, supplies and training, was used to coerce Japan into taking a larger military role.⁹ On 15 October 1952, Japan reorganized the National Police Reserve, created in 1950, into the National Security Force, supposedly indicating a greater commitment to its own defense.

C. GREATER COMMITMENT UNDER INCREASED CONSTRAINTS

Because of Japan's military non-participation in the Korean War, the United States was determined to increase Japan's military capability and contribution towards containing Communism. Shortly after the cessation of hostilities on the Korean peninsula, the United States stepped up its pressure on Japan to increase its military capability of the National Security Force (NSF). During the Ikeda-Robertson talks of October 1953, Japan did agree to gradually increase its self-defense capabilities. With the acceptance of military aid from the United States under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1954 and establishment of the Defense Agency, Japan appeared to be taking the necessary steps towards rearmament. This commitment towards a greater role in its own defense led post-war Japan to domestically producing its first ship and jet aircraft in 1956.

While incrementally succumbing to U.S. pressure, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was receiving pressure domestically to not yield to every American desire. The idea that Japan was becoming a military pawn of the United States, was continually articulated by

⁹The Mutual Security Assistance Pact, officially named the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between Japan and the United States of America, was basically a compilation of the U.S. Mutual Security Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1951.

the opposition, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP).¹⁰ In order to quell fears and show that the LDP was not simply a puppet of the United States, policies were enacted to specifically prevent Japan from becoming just another division in the U.S. army. The first domestically imposed constraint, since Article IX of the constitution, was the Ban on the Overseas Dispatch of its military forces in 1954.¹¹ This presented the image that the Japanese military was defending Japan and not U.S. interests, although these interests greatly overlapped each other.

The hosting of the first world Conference for the Prevention of Atomic Weapons eventually led to a ban on testing in 1954 followed by a subsequent ban on the weapons themselves in 1958. These policies were influenced by fears that the United States would have used atomic weapons in Korea, thus making Japan an accomplice by its support in the war effort. It, therefore, seemed that with every increase in its defense, Japan placed counter restraints and controls on its military.

In the late 1950s, Japan once again took incremental steps in commitment and constraints to alleviate external, U.S., and internal, opposition party, pressure. The Basic Policy for National Defense which was established on 20 May 1957, epitomized the balance of the two competing forces. The Basic Policy which was written with enough vagueness to please both sides, follows:

The objective of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the independence and peace of Japan founded upon democratic principles. To achieve this objective, the Government of Japan hereby establishes the

¹⁰Joseph P. Keddell, Jr., *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures*, (New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1993) 5.

¹¹Opposition party pressures grew when it was discovered that Prime Minister Yoshida, at the request of the U.S., secretly sent minesweepers under the control of the Maritime Guard Force to South Korea in October 1950. The mission subsequently suffered casualties which increase the domestic pressure against such future deployments. Source: Keddell, 34.

following principles:

1. To support the activities of the United Nations, and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.

2. To promote the public welfare and enhance the people's love for the country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security.

3. To develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense, with due regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation.

4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression.¹²

The legislating of the Basic Policies laid the ground work for the first Defense Buildup Plan the next month. It was easier for Diet members to accept the provisions in the buildup plan knowing that the forces would only be used for defense while overall deterrence was still being provided by the United States. The changes in Japan's capability provided by this new buildup, led to a conference on revising the security treaty with the United States. The result of this conference which commenced October 1958 was the Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation with the United States, enacted in 1960. The treaty ratification was not automatic as its discussion led to the treaty led to the 1960 crisis.¹³

The treaty was ratified only by a parliamentary stratagem and evoked continued opposition from a vocal segment of the population which has been able to check any extensive military commitments on the Japanese side. The treaty became law but the passions it aroused were sufficient to cause the ruling party to change leaders.¹⁴

¹²*Defense of Japan 1994*, 63.

¹³For more on the political issues of the 1960 Crisis see: Frank C. Langdon, *Japan's Foreign Policy*, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1973) 7-21 and Jon Livingston, Joe Monroe and Felicia Oldfather, *Postwar Japan: 1945 to the Present*, (New York: Random House, 1973) 367-380.

¹⁴Langdon, 7.

The Treaty of Mutual Security and Cooperation with the United States replaced the previously unequal agreement of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty of 1951. The major differences follow:

- U.S. forces could no longer be used to quell internal riots and disturbances.
- the United States no longer has a veto over any third country's military presence in Japan.
- the United States could no longer project military power from bases in Japan against a third country without consulting Japan concerning the threat to Japan and the region.
- recognition of contribution of Japan's armed forces in the defense against an armed attack.¹⁵

Based on the First Defense Buildup Plan, Japan was to procure defensive forces and increase its Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) in order to eventually replace U.S. forces upon their withdrawal. By the Third Defense Plan in 1966, the Defense Agency had begun requesting weapon systems with a more offensive character. This led to controversy over the procurement goals and the amount of financing required. The Defense Agency came under scrutiny for its request of spending greater than two percent of Japan's Gross National Product (GNP). The anti-militarists believed that these increases in spending would be used to support U.S. strategy in greater East Asia and not simply the defense of Japan.¹⁶ This was the first case in which Japan linked defense expenditures to its GNP to control rearmament by arguing that high levels of defense spending are detrimental to economic growth.

Diminishing military aid and increasing U.S. involvement in Vietnam, influenced Japan to place greater constraints on its armed forces and defense industry. Prime Minister Sato's statements in the Diet in April and December of 1967 concerning arms transfers and nuclear

¹⁵The entire treaty is located in the Appendix A.

¹⁶Keddell, 41-43.

weapons, respectively, have become accepted with the same respect as laws. Later known as the Ban on Arms Exports¹⁷ and the Three Non-nuclear Principles¹⁸, these policies were directed at Japan taking an international stand on the issues of arms control and nuclear proliferation. They also assisted in making Japan appear less aggressive to its neighbors while it found itself once again supporting a military venture by the United States with which it did not agree whole-heartedly.

As Japan embarked on building a self-sufficient military, one which could fend off an invasion without U.S. assistance, President Nixon announced a new U.S. strategy for the Pacific, later titled the Nixon Doctrine. It stated that Asian nations would assume more of the burden for their own ground defense, while the United States would still supply air and naval protection.¹⁹ A result of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam and Southeast Asia, this doctrine indicated a lack of U.S. commitment to Asia and the South East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), as the prestigious United States was discouraged by the much less sophisticated North Vietnam. The implications for Japan of this U.S. retrenchment from Asia

¹⁷The three principles on Arms Export declares that arms exports shall not be permitted to: 1) Communist bloc countries; 2) countries prohibited by the United Nations; and 3) countries involved in international conflict.

¹⁸The three Non-nuclear Principles stated that Japan would not possess, produce or introduce nuclear weapons into its country.

¹⁹Dr. Claude A. Buss offers the following analysis of the Nixon Doctrine: "By way of elaboration of the Nixon Doctrine, various spokesmen for the administration explained that the United States would remain strong in the Pacific as an encouragement to its friends and a deterrent to war, but would no longer immerse itself in the internal affairs of others. The United States would support nationalism, economic development and modernization in accordance with its interests and commitments. It would not turn its back on any nation of the region but would avoid the creation of situations in which there might be such dependency on the United States as to enmesh the United States inevitably in what were essentially Asian conflicts and problems. The United States wished to extend assistance to the greatest extent possible but in an orderly and judicious manner: it wished to participate as one Pacific nation among several in economic development and the maintenance of stability in Asia." See Claude A. Buss, *The United States and the Philippines*, (Stanford: AEI-Hoover Policy Studies, 1977) 101.

was obvious.

If the United States took a more passive role towards the relatively small weak states, it would probably expect considerably more from the healthy and more capable ones in Northeast Asia, such as Japan.²⁰

Prime Minister Sato used the change in U.S. strategy to ask for the return of Okinawa to Japan. Directly following the November 1969 summit in Washington, Prime Minister Sato and President Nixon released a joint communiqué agreeing on the return of the Ryukus islands to Japan's jurisdiction in 1972 and the subsequent extension of the present security treaty over Okinawa at that time. The Ryukus were the last remaining territory to be returned to Japan following World War II.²¹ The Sato-Nixon Communiqué has been referred to as "the high water mark for postwar Japanese-American relations,"²² prior to the subsequent deterioration of relations in the early 1970s.

D. GREATER SELF-RELIANCE RESULTING FROM DECREASED U.S. COMMITMENT

As President Nixon set off on his new Asian strategy to open relations with China, culminating with his historical trip to Beijing, Japan felt that it was being left behind and in the dark by the United States.

Prime Minister Sato, ... talked about 'self-reliant defense' in order to appeal to Japanese nationalist feeling which was impatient and fearful of American bases. The phrase had popular appeal and had the merit of attracting some support for Japan's defense forces and government policy. It also relied upon national resentment of American forces and enforced

²⁰Langdon, 122.

²¹The Ryukus and the Bonins islands, previously returned in 1968 were originally withheld from Japan as insurance against future aggression or remilitarization following World War II. Source: Livingston, 232.

²²Livingston, 275.

involvement in American Asian strategy.²³

While the debate over the constitutionality of the Self-defense forces once again arose, the LDP was placing constraints on the military as it attempted to buildup and replace the subsequent void left by the U.S. withdrawal. As the United States was withdrawing its troops from Vietnam and Japan, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) was announcing its new policy of "peaceful strength" in hopes of increasing its budget and the overall size of the SDF. With outside events increasing the opposition's position in the Diet²⁴, JDA was forced to come up with a compromise buildup plan while still appeasing the JSP.

On 16 February 1976, Prime Minister Miki announced a new view on arms exports to the Diet. The three principles of 1967 were reenforced by this new articulation of the policy which added specific definitions to the types of arms and technology which could not be exported. The first National Defense Program Outline (NDPO), released in October 1976, was an attempt to clearly articulate the end strength goal for the SDF, thereby decreasing attention on the JDA by the opposition party. With its clear declaration of the posture and missions as well as the expected force size of the three branches of the SDF, the NDPO had become the focal point for of all military expenditures and future JDA budgets.²⁵

In conjunction with the NDPO, the One Percent Ceiling was also adopted in 1976. This limit on military spending which was not to exceed one percent of Japan's GNP, was an indirect result of U.S. pressure for Japan to increase its military spending. With the existance of the JSDF and its subsequent budgetary requests continually causing heated debates in the Diet, the One Percent Ceiling was a means of structuring military expenditures in such a way

²³Langdon, 120.

²⁴1)Decreased threat due to end of Vietnam War, 2)zero economic growth caused by the oil crisis of 1973, and 3)scandal over Lockheed's aircraft sales to the JDA; all reenforced the JSP position that defense spending should decreased and strictly controlled.

²⁵The force levels of the NDPO are listed in the Appendix B.

to appease both pro and the anti-military advocates.²⁶

To facilitate achievement of NDPO force levels, the government formulated the 1978 Mid-Term Planning Estimate (MTPE), which essentially was a five year weapons procurement plan. The 1978 MTPE (1980-1984) was aimed at making qualitative improvements in defense capabilities through education, training, and implementation of technological advances.²⁷ The JDA's goal was to shift the focus of defense away from money and on to force and equipment capability.

E. EROSION OF POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS

As the Reagan Administration took office in the early 1980s, the United States increased its political pressure on Japan seeking increases in military spending and procurement. Public pressure in the United States was partially driven by the increasing trade deficit with Japan. Even without U.S. pressure, Japan found itself being trapped by its own policies. The NDPO and One Percent Ceiling became opposing constraints on Japan's Defense Budget. The NDPO called for increases in military equipment in order to meet the force levels stated in 1976, yet the One Percent Ceiling placed fiscal constraints on procurement which would prevent the desired force levels from ever being reached. The option of purchasing or producing inferior and outdated equipment to meet the target force requirements, would contradict the language of the NDPO which calls for the "consideration to qualitative improvements aimed at parity with the technical standards of other nations."

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, also increased the U.S. concern for burden sharing with its allies. Greater pressure was placed on Japan to pay its fair share for

²⁶This policy did not dramatically effect Japan's defense budget since it had consistently been below 1% GNP since 1967. The limitation imposed was more rhetorical since Japan's method for accounting its defense expenditures are different from most other nations and therefore not an accurate method of comparison. Keddell 64-67, 82-86.

²⁷Keddell, 69.

the containment of the Soviet Union.²⁸ In May 1981, during the annual summit, Prime Minister Suzuki and President Reagan confirmed the "alliance relationship" between the two countries as Japan agreed to increase its share of the defense burden.²⁹ This greater commitment led Japan to accept responsibility for defending the sea lanes out to 1000 miles in 1982. In 1983, Japan agreed to allow the transfer of defense-related technologies to the United States in order to decrease tensions between the nations.³⁰ This agreement eased Japan's anti-military constraints by making the United States the exception to its 1967 Ban on Arms Exports. In addition, the Three Non-Nuclear Principles were believed to have eroded to the "2.5 Non-Nuclear Principles" since critics contended that the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) were conducting joint maneuvers with U.S. naval vessels that were suspected of carrying nuclear weapons.³¹

As the realization that the SDF was incapable of meeting the sea lane defense commitment, the 1981 MTPE (1983-1987) increased procurement of air and maritime assets. The procurement schedule placed increasing pressure on the one percent GNP ceiling yet domestic politics prevented any further action on the matter. Following the July 1986 elections, which marked the LDP's greatest victory, Prime Minister Nakasone forced the

²⁸In 1981, the U.S. Secretary of Defense was required by Congress to submit an annual "allied commitments report." Its purposes was to tract allied progress towards meeting the 3 percent spending objective agreed upon in 1977. Lower defense spending differentials for allies were believed to make their forces less capable. Source: Keddell, 81.

²⁹See *Defense of Japan 1983*, Reference 35, Joint communiqué between Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki and President Ronald Reagan, May 8, 1981, p299-300.

³⁰Japan saw this agreement as reciprocation for the transfer of U.S. technologies during the 1950s and 1960s, which greatly benefited Japan's economy. Source: *Defense of Japan 1983*, p211-12.

³¹Keddell, 126.

abandonment of the one percent ceiling on January 27, 1987.³² This stronger commitment to the United States was further symbolized three days later with an agreement to assume the United States Forces Japan (USFJ) expenses on Japanese labor by June 1987. In 1988, the US and Japan entered into the codevelopment of the FSX.

While these developments took place in Japan, the appearance of Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost policies in the Soviet Union heralded the eventual end of the Cold War. A new strategic setting appeared in Northeast Asia which was to alter the entire course of U.S.-Japan relations.

³²The ceiling was eclipsed by using an incremental defense spending increase in the budget. The 1985 proposed 1.004 percent expenditure had been postponed to diminish controversy prior to the election.

III. NORTHEAST ASIA STRATEGIC SETTING

In the past decade, the economic and military growth which occurred in East Asia has attracted significant attention to the region. In order for the United States to proceed with its National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement in Asia, a reevaluation of the players and policies is required to better prepare the alliance of the United States and Japan for the 21st century. This chapter will address the shifts occasioned by the end of the Cold War in the military and security policies of the countries posing potential threats to stability in Northeast Asia. This short list consists of Russia, China, and North Korea.³³

Since the end of the Cold War, East Asia has followed a trend of downsizing. As Soviet Union forces were disbanded and/or turned over to the Commonwealth of Independent States, the United States and its allies have also made significant force reductions in the region. Many have expected to reap the benefits which Francis Fukayama wrote of in *The End of History*. The United States and Northeast Asia nations however have not been willing to believe that the world has become benevolent even though Russia is not perceived to be the threat it once was. Since *the End of History* was written, the Gulf War, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia and the Balkan War have indicated that U.S. resolve and commitment is directly proportional to the perception of the economic and strategic importance of the region.³⁴ There is no question that the United States will strive for continued engagement in the region throughout the next century.

The strategic situation in Northeast Asia has been one of relative peace and stability

³³The Republic of Korea (ROK) is not considered a threat to regional stability due to the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 and close ties it maintains with the United States. With South Korea mainly focused on the DPRK, the tensions that still exist between them and Japan are at a level not warranting consideration at this time.

³⁴These three cases were chosen to exemplify the spectrum of U.S. involvement in the post Cold War Era.

since the end of hostilities in the Korean War in 1953.³⁵ The lack of military and political action does not indicate that concerns over neighboring military and economic power has been absent. Directly influenced by the ending of the cold war and, more recently, the results of the Gulf War, strategic and military thinking in the region has followed two major trends; 1) offensive military strategies of maneuver are replacing defensive ones of attrition and 2) military acquisitions and force structures are being altered to concentrate power in smaller, more mobile units.

The regional increase in offensive minded and power projection tactics and strategies is not a 20th century revelation. Sun Tzu discussed the use of maneuver warfare centuries ago. It is the most recent communist military successes in Russia (Revolution and World War II) and China (Revolution and Korean Wars) which used overwhelming numbers and attrition of the enemy that greatly influenced military strategists in these three countries over the last four decades. Recent military triumphs and technological advances however, have played a large role reversing this train of military thought.

This trend of offensive strategies and tactics will most likely continue until engagement of a western power in the next war or major conflict. Its subsequent lessons learned will then reenforce or contradict the recent lessons of mobility and power projection from Desert Storm and the Falkland Islands.

Desmond Ball, in his article "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," discusses consistency in regional arms-buying programs. The systems that have aroused the most interest in the region include:

- national command, control and communications systems
- national strategic and tactical intelligence systems
- multi-role fighter aircraft with maritime attack and air superiority capabilities
- maritime surveillance aircraft

³⁵The Sino-Soviet border disputes of 1969 are noted as they finally convinced the United States that the Sino-Soviet split was for real.

- anti-ship missiles
- modern surface combatants--destroyers, frigates, ocean patrol vessels
- submarines
- electronic warfare systems
- rapid deployment forces

These acquisitions although showing an emphasis toward naval and maritime forces clearly indicate a shift from the concept of attrition to mobility.³⁶ The renunciation of the old Soviet and Chinese doctrines is reenforced by these trends in military procurement.

In conjunction with this pattern, these countries have followed the tendency of the United States in downsizing their militaries in favor of smaller, more modern units. The Japanese Self-Defense Force epitomizes the type of small modern force which is desired in the region. Having established the general trends of the region, the following sections will address the specific military tendencies in each country of concern.

A. RUSSIA

With the end of the cold war, both Japan and the United States have downgraded the threat posed by Russia in Northeast Asia. Russia has oftentimes taken on the role of friend rather than foe in negotiations with the United States.³⁷ In the Japanese Defense Agency's annual *White Paper* (Defense of Japan 1994), the perceived Russian threat has been

³⁶Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region." *International Security*, v18 n3 (Winter 1993-94) 81.

³⁷On April 4, 1993, at Vancouver President Clinton and President Yeltsin declared their firm commitment to a partnership that strengthens international stability. Source: Department of Defense Office of International Security Affairs, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], February 1995) 15.

considerably reduced and is placed below that of North Korea.³⁸ The Kurile Island issue, however, remains a considerable hurdle for both Russia and Japan to resolve before normal relations achieve a higher level.³⁹

Before addressing Russia's actual military might in the region, their military strategy for use of these forces will be discussed. In 1987, the Warsaw Pact under Mikhail Gorbachev's leadership, changed its overall military doctrine to a strictly defensive stance. The Soviet Union then claimed it would never, under any circumstances, begin military action against another state.⁴⁰ This "New Thinking" in military strategy was inherited by Russia upon the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It was not until 1993 that Yeltsin eventually reversed this pattern of military thought. Dr. Vladimir I. Ivanov, in *Asia in the 21st Century*, discussing Russia's new military doctrine, states:

The Russian Federation's new state emblem is the two-headed eagle--a symbol of the duality of its national interests. As a power located geographically both in Europe and in Asia, Russia has interests in the West and the East. Another view is that the double-headed eagle symbolizes Russia's uneasy transition from the past, represented by the Russian Empire and the former Soviet Union, to the future. Russia's new military doctrine, endorsed in November 1993, is a product of these two interpretations. One head of the eagle holds firmly to Russia's imperial past and the Soviet superpower legacy, the other looks for partnership and constructive involvement in world affairs.⁴¹

³⁸Charles Smith, "Western Front: Defence Strategists Plan for a Post Cold-War World," *Far East Economic Review*, v157 n30 (July 28, 1994) 16.

³⁹Russia, then the Soviet Union, never signed the peace agreement ending World War II, and is therefore officially still at war with Japan.

⁴⁰Michael M. Boll, "The Revolution in Soviet/Russian Military Doctrine 1984-1994," *Russia's New Doctrine: Two Views* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994) 13.

⁴¹Vladimir I. Ivanov, "Russia's New Military Doctrine: Implications for Asia," *Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities*, (Washington: National Defense University, 1994) 205.

This new strategy which seems to revert back to the old Soviet mind set, was propagated for external as much as internal consumption. In conjunction with this doctrinal change, the recent use of the phrase *near abroad* in Russia's foreign affairs is an attempt to encompass the former Soviet republics into its sphere of influence. Although internal political pressure brought on by the recent nationalist movement may have caused the acceptance of this expression and new military doctrine by Yeltsin, it has been used as the mandate for Russian activity inside the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).⁴²

Although the Soviet Union has been partitioned into thirteen newly independent states, Russia has maintained control over most if not all of the military establishment in the Far East. The new military doctrine also declares that the Russian military is in a transitional period and its overall goal is to become smaller and more mobile while establishing a higher level of readiness.⁴³ This is clearly evident when looking at their military forces in the Pacific area. Figures (1) through (4) show the quantitative reductions in forces since 1985. What is noteworthy is that most reductions have been made by removing obsolete and older equipment from the inventory. With the economic hardship that has struck Russia since its opening to the west, Moscow has made the conscious decision of attempting to maintain the latest inventory of weapons while saving money through less operations and training.

When looking towards East Asia, Russia has made considerable strides in its relations with China while being reluctant to smooth over its old conflicts with Japan. This has lead to its subsequent "China first" policy. The 1992 Russo-Chinese non-aggression pact/treaty states that neither party will enter into an alliance or allow foreign forces on their soil. The reduction of troop levels shown in figure (1) can be directly attributed to the demilitarization

⁴²Russian forces in the Transcaucus region are a clear example of Moscow's attempt at establishing its sphere of influence.

⁴³James F. Holcomb, "The Implications of Russia's Military Doctrine," *Russia's New Doctrine: Two Views* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994) 6-7.

of the border with China.⁴⁴ This reenforces Russia's decision of placing military and strategic concerns before economic prosperity in Asia. It is this bias that sees the Kuriles as a strategic holding for Russian access to the Pacific and not as a tool to normalize relations with Japan.

The sale of 26 Su-27 jet fighters, a large number of S300 air-defense missile systems and two to four Kilo-class conventional submarines for an estimated \$1.8 billion to China from Russia has as much to do with buying influence as it does with economics.⁴⁵ The result, however, is an increase in the rift between Russia and Japan as the west perceives these as destabilizing transfers. If Moscow's main concern was the revitalization of its desolate economy, policies which would foster relations with Tokyo, which has the monetary clout to assist Russia in this respect, would take precedence over military sales to China. Not being the case, Russia is exemplifying the mind set of an old continental power as it places the strategic importance of China ahead of the financial importance of Japan.⁴⁶ Russian actions lends to the theory that it is seeking a future military alliance with China as it attempts to increase its influence through diplomacy and military sales.


Although the threat posed by Russia in Northeast Asia has decreased since 1990, it has by no means disappeared. Russia's political moves indicate that it is not willing to accept the western system of free market capitalism as its economic and political savior as it once did. Although the reliability of its equipment as well as the manning and proficiency levels of its forces are questionable at best, the sheer maintenance of forces at such levels as well as the present military strategy require that Russia be continued to be assessed as a potential future threat to stability in the region.

⁴⁴Since the break up of the USSR, the conscription system in Russia has been in disarray causing many units to be undermanned. This phenomenon may be used as an alternate explanation of the reduction of forces in the region.

⁴⁵Tai Ming Cheung, "China's Buying Spree: Russia Up to Upgrade Peking's Weaponry," *Far East Economic Review*, v156 n27 (July 8, 1993) 24.

⁴⁶Stephen J. Blank, *The New Russia in the New Asia* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994) 11-24.


Russian Ground Troops in the Far East



Source: *Defense of Japan 1994*, 45.

Figure 1


Russian Naval Forces in the Far East



Source: *Defense of Japan 1994*.

Figure 2


Russian Air Force (Fighters) in the Far East



Source: *Defense of Japan 1994*, 47.

Figure 3

Russian Air Force (Bombers) in the Far East



Source: *Defense of Japan 1994*, 47.

Figure 4

B. CHINA

China is now economically strong. In the 21st century, China will become a threat. In the past, all big economic powers turned into big military powers. Southeast Asia is cautious of China's southward advancing.

-Japan Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama⁴⁷

Recent estimates of double digit growth have placed China in the spotlight as an expected economic power in the near future. China's projected gross domestic produce (GDP) will easily eclipse Japan's and all others in Asia by 2010.⁴⁸ This economic prosperity will likely increase China's assertiveness and lessen its cooperation with its neighbors, thus leading to greater instability in the region. The effects of economic development on China's foreign policy is uncertain. While many hope it will foster more benevolent policies, realist thinking suggests that policies resembling realpolitik will be in China's future as it attempts to increase its influence proportionate to its economic and military power.⁴⁹

In 1985 when Deng Xiaoping declared that there was no longer a threat of a large scale war in China's near future, the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) modified its military thinking to accompany this new paradigm. Without the requirement to maintain large forces for an approaching war, a long term strategic vision placing emphasis on modernization was

⁴⁷"Japan's Choices -- 50 Years after the End of World War II: Cold Peace (Part 5): Logic of Redefining Security Arrangement: Overshadowed by Military Power Buildup and Economic Growth: 'China Threat Argument' Rising without Seeing Actual Conditions," *Mainichi*, 15 March 1995, (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 25-27 March 1995) 7-8.

⁴⁸Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon?: China's Threat to East Asian Security," *International Security*, v19 n1 (Summer 1994) 149-150.

⁴⁹China's foreign policies over the past 50 years exemplifies realpolitik at its best, as it has continued to use its position in the international system to its fullest potential. See Roy, 157.

adopted.⁵⁰ China's "Strategic turning point in ideas governing the buildup of the Armed Forces" sets the goal of becoming the world's premier military force by 2050.⁵¹

Since 1984 the PLA has steadily decreased its manning from 4,000,000 to 2,930,000 in 1994. With the demilitarizing of the border and normalization of relations with Russia to include the non-aggression pact, China has been free to reduce its manning requirements. These reductions indicate not only a lessening of hostilities in the region toward China but also a redirecting of resources away from manning and towards modernization of its armed forces.

China's military expenditures which decreased during the 1980s, have increased dramatically in the past three years, culminating with a twenty five percent increase in 1994. The true figures for expenditures are four to five times higher since research and development as well as pensions are not included. In addition, the profits generated by the armed forces economic endeavors are also not accounted for in the official budget. It is estimated that China's military owns up to 20,000 companies with their profit being funneled back into the PLA's budget.⁵² China's military can grow at an explosive rate virtually undetected because of this arrangement.

The Gulf War was responsible for China reevaluating its military thinking which had always emphasized the importance of men (people's war) over machine. Much of Iraq's inadequate weaponry including twenty percent of its tanks, had been supplied by China with the rest of the hardware being superior to that in China's inventory. This was the principal impetus for China's \$1.8 billion arms purchase from Russia which included SU-27s, S-300s and Kilo submarines. Arms purchases from Russia have increased steadily over the past few years to an estimated \$5 billion in 1994. Recently, China has aggressively pursued the

⁵⁰Valentin Shishlevskiy, "China's Defense Policy: Redefining Security Interests & Rewriting Military Doctrines," *Asian Defense Journal* (February 1995) 30-31.

⁵¹Shishlevskiy, 31.

⁵²"China's New Model Army," *Economist*, v331 n7867 (June 11,1994) 29.

acquisition of an ex-Soviet aircraft carrier from Ukraine. Western diplomacy, however, has been successful in preventing such a transaction. In addition to military sales, there are presently about 1,000 Russian military technicians working in China to help enhance its rocket and nuclear technology.⁵³ Although Chinese scientists have exhibited the ability to enhance existing technology, they have been unsuccessful in obtaining or discovering key breakthroughs.

With one third of its claimed maritime territory being occupied or illegally exploited by other countries, China has set out on a naval buildup to protect its claims. These claims of course include the oil rich Spratly Islands. As a result, it has also embarked on a plan to convert its huge and ineffective inventory of 1950s and 1960s aircraft, tanks and patrol boats into a smaller, more cohesive and mobile force.

If the rate of economic growth provides the single best indicator of increases for subsequent defense expenditures among East Asian countries, then China is expected to continue in its military purchases of advanced weaponry.⁵⁴ A consensus exists among western nations not to sell advanced weapons to China because it would be destabilizing for the region.

It is not simply China's desire to increase its military capability which makes it a potential threat in the future, for China continues to carry distrust and animosity towards Japan and other western powers due to past atrocities. Japan is, therefore, perceived as threatening and antagonistic towards China as long as it is backed by the United States which desires the ultimate downfall of the Communist regime.

⁵³Mikhail Urusov, "Russia is Arming China," *Moscow News*, n40 (October 7, 1994) 8.

⁵⁴Desmond Ball argues this point in "Arms and Affluence," 81-83.

C. NORTH KOREA (DPRK)

The Korean peninsula is often described as the "last bastion of the Cold War." The confrontation between North and South that continues to exist has generally been explained by one of two concepts. The situation is perceived either as a remaining relic of the cold war or as a long standing and unresolved civil war. Regardless of the cause, it endures as the most militarized region of the world.

Both countries are still officially in a state of war with each other, since only an armistice to cease hostilities and not a peace treaty resulted from the war in the 1950s. With this in mind, North Korea sees its ultimate goal being the reunification of the peninsula under one, "socialist" government. Perceiving military force as simply another option in obtaining unification, North Korea has established a national military strategy centered around "communizing" the South.

Since 1962, North Korea has structured its national strategy around its "Four Point Military Guidelines." With an objective of military supremacy over the South, this policy calls for the continual enhancement of its military forces through the four following principles:

1. The whole people will be armed.
2. The whole country will be fortified.
3. All soldiers will be trained as cadre. Each person will be capable of performing the duties of his immediate supervisor.
4. All arms will be modernized.⁵⁵

With two thirds of its 1.2 million armed services personnel believed to be staged near the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), it is evident that North Korea takes these principles serious.

With its capital of Seoul, which contains the majority of its population and industry, located in close proximity to the DMZ, South Korea would be expected to be extremely

⁵⁵*Defense of Japan 1994* (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1994) 37.

concerned about the balance of military forces. It is generally accepted, however, that South Korea's technological edge makes up for the disproportionate numbers shown in table (2). South Korea feels that it has the ability to thwart an offensive by the North without the use of United States Forces Korea (USFK). The one U.S. infantry division and two air wings are nonetheless encouraged to remain as an additional deterrence or "trip wire" against the North should it miscalculate the quality difference.

North Korea's military strategy for the use of these forces is a unique blending of the PRC's "people's war" concept and the defense in depth, attrition strategy of the former Soviet Union. North Korea has also incorporated experience gained in the Korean War, Vietnam and the Middle East in the devising of its clearly offensive strategy. It incorporates preemptive or surprise attacks, blitzkrieg maneuvers as well as a mixing of regular and irregular warfare.⁵⁶ Recently North Korea has transformed its tank and other mechanized divisions into smaller more mobile brigades which can operate more effectively on Korean terrain.

Although hampered by its inferior defense industry, North Korea attempts to modernize its armed forces through indigenous production of imitation Soviet T-72 tanks and 23 mm self-propelled anti-aircraft guns. Attempting to compensate for the weak points in its military capability made evident by the results of the Gulf War, North Korea is hoping to integrate unconventional warfare (commandos and special forces) with Korean specific terrain through the use of tunnels in the carrying out of infiltration and sabotage missions. It is envisioned that this unconventional warfare will offset the lack of air and naval power possessed by North Korea.

⁵⁶*Defense White Paper 1993-1994*, (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 1994) 57.

North-South Korean Military Comparison

	<u>DPRK</u>	<u>ROK</u>		<u>DPRK</u>	<u>ROK</u>
<u>Ground Forces</u>			<u>Air Force</u>		
Personnel	1,000,000	520,000	Personnel	82,000	53,000
Main Battle Tanks	3,700	1,900	Jet Fighters	614	334 (52)*
Armored Personnel Carriers	2,500	2,000	Bombers	80	0
Artillery (Towed & Self-propelled)	6,800	4,400	Total Combat Aircraft	770	447 (52)*
Multiple Rocket Launchers	2,280	140	<u>Navy</u>		
Surface-to surface missile launchers	84	12	Personnel	46,000	60,000 ‡
Antiaircraft Artillery	8,800	600	Principal Surface Combatants	3	40
			Patrol and Coastal Combatants	390	122
<u>Total Personnel</u>	1,128,000	633,000	Submarines	25 ‡	2
Note: 36,250 personnel (26,500 army & 9,750 air force) and 84 combat aircraft of United States Forces Korea (USFK) not included. * Number in parentheses indicates number in storage. ‡ 25,000 Marines included. ‡ 50 midget submarines not included. Source: IISS <i>The Military Balance 1994-1995</i> .					

Table 2.

Since the removal of economic support from the then Soviet Union, North Korea has experience negative economic growth since 1990. To manage this problem the DPRK initially made efforts to improve relations with the United States and Japan at the end of the Cold War. The western community was however experiencing euphoria over the reunification of Germany and was expecting the Korean peninsula shortly to follow suit. The United States detected no reason to initiate any actions which would extend the life of the DPRK thereby holding up its assimilation into the ROK.

With the discovery that the DPRK was providing Iraq with nuclear and missile technology prior to the Gulf War, North Korea became labeled a rogue or backlash state by the United States increasing its isolation from the West and rest of the world. When the issue of international isolation is coupled with the fact that North Korea's military is technologically inferior to that of South Korea, it becomes clear that the development of nuclear weapons and

missile delivery systems would become the logical strategic policy choice.

With its conventional military threat assessed, North Korea's potential nuclear threat has brought the DPRK into the international limelight in 1994. As China and Russia both were turning to the west, North Korea found itself alone and in need of a deterrent to match South Korea's alliance with the United States. With the economic dilemma taking its toll, it perceived the possession of nuclear weapons as the easiest solution to its problems. It would supply a deterrent force against South Korea and replace the nuclear umbrella of Russia and China through indigenous development. Although the DPRK presently possesses chemical and biological technology and most likely weapons, it further sought to attain nuclear weapons.

In October 1994, international attention was placed upon North Korea's nuclear program when an agreement with the United States was made which subsequently freezes North Korea's program, in exchange for money, new facilities and resources (i.e. petroleum). The payment which exceeds \$4 billion will be paid by the ROK and Japan in addition to the United States. A bigger prize anticipated by North Korea is that continued discussions will hopefully lead to a normalization of relations with the United States and therefore ending its isolation from the west.⁵⁷

In conjunction with its nuclear program, the DPRK has aggressively pursued a ballistic missile development program since the early 1980s. Using the technology obtained through the purchase of DF-61s from China and Soviet Scud-Bs from Egypt, North Korea began indigenously producing Scuds in 1981. Figure (5) illustrates the subsequent progression to the development and production of the No-dong 1 missile in 1993. This 1000 km range missile has the ability to not only reach Tokyo but Beijing and Taipei also. Similar to China, North Korea has shown the ability to enhance existing technology, such as in the case of the

⁵⁷"North Korea Takes the Money," *Economist*, v334 n7897, (14 January 1995) 36.


development of the Nodong 1.⁵⁸ The estimated ranges for the follow on Taep'o-dong 1 and 2, shown in figure (6), will give North Korea the ability to influence events external to the Korean peninsula.

Sales of missiles have been used to bolster further development of the overall program. North Korean sales have been primarily limited to other "rogue" states which have been shunned by the United States and/or Soviet Union such as Syria, Iran and Iraq. The CIA estimates that at the present rate of advancement, North Korea will develop a missile that can reach the continental United States within 15 years.⁵⁹

By accommodating the United States and South Korea, the DPRK has focused attention away from its ballistic missile program. Continued production and development will eventually lead to instability as the number and accuracy of missiles increase. By seeking development of nuclear weapons and a viable delivery system, North Korea has gained the attention of the West and obtained the upper hand in negotiating reunification with South Korea. The DPRK's military modernization programs have led to increased diplomatic leverage in its quest for its ultimate goal of unification.

⁵⁸While Western isolation and economic sanctions may have increased the expense of a DPRK missile industry, it by no means prevented its existence.

⁵⁹"North Korea's Ballistic Missile Program," *North Korea: A Potential Time Bomb*, (Surrey: Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report No.2, 1994) 15.



Source: "North Korea: A Potential Time Bomb," Jane's Intelligence Review Special Report No. 2

Figure 5

NORTH KOREAN BALLISTIC MISSILES

	DF-61 R-17E	Scud B Mod A	Scud Mod B	Scud Mod C	Scud Mod E	No-dong 1	Taep'o- dong 1	Taep'o- dong 2
Other designations					Scud C Scud PIP	Scud D No-dong 1	No-dong 2 Scud X Scud Mod E No-dong 2	
Range(km)	600	280-300	280-300	320-340	500	1000- 1300	1500- 2000	2000- 3,500
Warhead(kg)	1000	1000	1000	1000	700-800	800	—	2
Stages	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2
Length(m)	9	11.7	11.7	11.7?	—	15.4?	—	—
Diameter(m)	1	0.9	0.9	0.9?	1.2?	—	—	—
Weight(tons)	6	6.37	6.37	6.37?	1989	1993	1995-1998	—
DPRK IOC	NA	1981	1984	1985	1989	1993	1995-1998	—

Source: "North Korea: A Potential Time Bomb," Jane's Intelligence Review Special Report No. 2

Figure 6

D. SUMMARY

The Northeast Asian countries of Russia, China and North Korea with similar trends in their strategic thinking now loom as the principle antagonists in the future to the United States and Japan in East Asia and the Pacific. They are (1) establishing offensive military strategies based on maneuver and (2) acquiring the appropriate military weapon system to implement these offensive strategies.

Russia and China have both reassessed their military doctrines to include the concept of power projection. North Korea by virtue of its ballistic missile program and virtual nuclear program is obtaining weapons which greatly increase its offensive potential. Although Russia is not procuring offensive weapon systems such as China and North Korea, by virtue of its process of reduction, the resulting force will be more mobile than the original larger force.

In the end all three countries are throwing off defensive postures which were a result of the U.S. containment policy in favor of offensive tactics. The problem is that offensive tactics usually end up becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, as was the case in Europe prior to World War I. Germany, France, Austria and Russia all had offensive military strategies which led their leaders to have a "use it or lose it" mentality concerning their armed forces. Offensive policies have in the past lead to offensive acts and subsequently "the Great War." In contrast, the situation in Northeast Asia may well be proceeding down the path of western democracy and non-aggression described in Francis Fukayama's "The End of History." Fortunately the U.S.-Japan relationship provides a stabilizing force which has deterred the outbreak of hostilities and makes for peace and prosperity throughout the entire region.

IV. REASSESSMENT OF JAPAN'S INTERNATIONAL ROLE SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR

Since the Berlin wall came crashing down in 1989, the West has been scrambling to cash in on its supposed victory over the totalitarian east. The actual ending of the Cold War, for the most part, caught the West by surprise and unprepared for the future. Formal foreign and domestic policies were not pre-established to address the sudden change from the bipolar to a multipolar world. As academics spoke of the new security framework and politicians referred to the new world order, Japan found itself near "center stage" of the international community without a "director" to supply it with cues.

Japan, like the United States, has found itself undergoing ad hoc domestic changes due to the overall decrease in international tensions as it struggles to discover a new international strategy. Through cost-benefit analysis, Japan must determine the best approach to increase its world standing.⁶⁰ As the leading market democracy in Asia, Japan sees only short term threats to itself in the realm of economics and market access. With China being its potentially biggest economic adversary as well as means for opportunity, Japan maintains a hedging strategy by taking steps to protect itself against China while also attempting to secure greater levels of cooperation through financial loans and direct investment. Japan has the luxury of reassessing its China policy secure in the knowledge that it is closely supported by its U.S. ally.

Due to its unique geographic position, Japan is not afforded the comfort of being economically independent. A lack of resources has forced it to become dependent on international trade. With this in mind concerted efforts since the occupation period have transformed Japan into the economic power which exists today.

This chapter will address the domestic and external factors which have influenced

⁶⁰Japan's world standing is defined not only as its economic power, but also its ability to influence others through diplomacy. Due to the continued anti-Japanese sentiment throughout Asia, Japan has been reluctant in the realm of international negotiations.

Japan as it reassesses its "new" national security strategy. The four major events which have driven Japan's policies over the last decade have been the ending of the Cold War, the Gulf War, the economic recession of the early 1990s and the political scandal which divided the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and caused its fall from power. The effects of these four events have had repercussion not only on the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) but throughout the political-military spectrum.

A. POST COLD WAR DEVELOPMENTS

With the ending of the cold war, Japan's importance increased as the international system quickly moved from the old bipolar system of alliances to the new multipolar system of greater economic interdependence. Primarily because of its economic power, second only to the United States, Japan possessed the financial and industrial assets to greatly influence the world which now perceived its economic assistance as more valuable than the security assurances provided by the two waning superpowers. This new leadership role caught Japan unprepared as it found itself with greater choices as well as demands for its financial investment in foreign countries.

Having been deeply immersed in the bilateral security agreement with the United States, Japan for the most part, had conditioned its international position on critical issues to being the same as or parallel to the U.S. position. This is not to say that the Japanese and U.S. positions were not similar on most issues, but Japan had seemingly resigned itself to waiting for a United States formal statement or policy before publicly taking a stand on a critical issue. As long as the Soviet Union posed a credible threat, U.S. security assurances were paramount for Japan's continued prosperity. With the supposedly decreased threat, Japan found itself in a position to take a more independent role in dictating its foreign policy, as the degree of U.S. influence subsequently waned.

The Gulf War revolutionized Japanese thinking on security and defense. As a large portion of the world's nations joined together to punish unlawful aggression, Japan found itself isolated with its anti-aggression rhetoric and anti-military policies. The significant

danger that was posed against the oil reserves in the Middle East was clearly evident to Japan, as it found its hands tied concerning this threat to its national well-being. Unlike Germany, whom has not been seeking an increased international role and has been actively engaged in a policy of appeasement with its neighbors, Japan has become interested in a more active international role for itself.

Only after heavy U.S. pressure did Japan, which was prepared to once again sit back and reap the benefits of the crisis without making any major contribution, donated funds in the sum of \$13 billion to the multinational forces.⁶¹ In order to maintain good relations with the United States, Japan sent minesweepers after the hostilities concluded for what was labeled as peaceful purposes, therefore not violating its Ban on Overseas Dispatch.⁶² The Gulf War showed Japan that economic power in the absence of a capable military force and a willingness to deploy this force is inadequate for obtaining the recognition as a world power. Along with the end of the Cold War, the effect of the Gulf War and the recession beginning in 1992, the changes in domestic politics have been the greatest influence in the debates for a new strategic policy.

Although the recession followed the Gulf War, it was not the \$13 billion spent to defray its cost or the following rise in oil prices which caused Japan's economy to reverse its direction. After four consecutive years of above average growth from 1986 to 1990, Japan's economy began to slow and fall into a recession.⁶³ Led first by a financial crash, caused by overrated stock and land prices, Japan experienced a significant reduction in its growth rate in 1992 followed by an actual shrinkage of its economy the following year. The -0.2 growth rate in 1993 as shown in figure 7 was Japan's lowest since 1974 following the oil crisis.


⁶¹For comparison, Germany donated \$11 billion and dispatched five minesweepers to the Persian Gulf in March in addition to sending surface-to-air missiles, eighteen aircraft and hundreds of support personnel to Turkey earlier in the crisis.

⁶²Consensus building within the Diet on this issue was the major reason for the delay in the deployment.

⁶³Average annual growth is considered to be three percent.

The recession had caused Japan to take many concerted steps in an attempt to reverse the trend. The Ministry of Finance (MoF) dramatically increased fiscal spending in 1992 to bolster domestic demand. Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa's first major act after his election in August 1993 was to push both the MoF and the Bank of Japan (BoJ) to take greater action.⁶⁴ As Japan attempts to stimulate domestic demand through various policies, such as a ¥5 trillion cut in personal income taxes in 1994 and the ¥30 trillion in increased public-works expenditures. A strong yen internationally along with a continued trade surplus have not been enough to initiate substantial growth of Japan's economy.

Economic - Military Comparison



* Based on Official Budget.

Source: Japan 1995, An International Comparison and Defense of Japan 1994.

Figure 7.

Although officially reported at slightly over 3% in 1994, Japan's true unemployment

⁶⁴"Japan," *Asia 1994 Yearbook* (Far East Economic Review, 1994) 145.

rate is probably closer to 10% because idle workers are not included in the compilation. The estimated growth for 1994 of 2.4 percent indicates only a slight reversal in the recession and by no means a return to the bubble economy of the 1980s.

Despite the recession, Japan continued to increase its direct foreign investment abroad. Foreseeing eventual domestic labor shortages, Japanese firms continued their policies of globalization in order to secure overseas markets with the majority of their foreign investments being concentrated in East Asia/Asia-Pacific region.

Along with the end of the Cold War, the effect of the Gulf War, and the recession beginning in 1992, the changes in domestic politics have been the greatest influence in the debates for a new strategic policy. In 1955 unknown to the Japanese at the time, a political system which would control Japan's government for decades was born. The Liberal Democratic Party established almost exclusive control over the government while the Japan Socialist Party⁶⁵ maintaining clearly different political views was the opposition party in parliament. Over these decades Japan was ruled by the "iron triangle" formed among the governmental, bureaucratic and business circles. This system which concentrated on its own self-perpetuation was not concerned with democracy as the Japanese people were left out of the decision process.⁶⁶ This setup allowed for easy consensus building concerning close security relations with the United States. The existence of an "elitist" bureaucracy in Japan recently has come under criticism for their desiring to perpetuate the old system of alliance with big business as the dominant factor in policy making.⁶⁷ Sentiment increased for a more respectable role for politicians as well as being more representative of the Japanese people.

⁶⁵The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) was later reorganized into the Socialist Democratic Party of Japan (SDP or SDPJ).

⁶⁶Kazuo Aichi, "Objections to Secretary General Ozawa," *Bungei Shunju*, January 1995 (Japanese Magazine Review: American Embassy, Tokyo, February 1995) 19.

⁶⁷"Urging 'Bureaucrats' to Stand Up: Fulfill Your Real Duty; Do Not Roughshod over Politics," *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, 14 March 1995 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 16 March 1995) 7-8.

On 14 October 1992, Shin Kanemaru, the leader of the Keiseikai or Takeshita faction of the LDP resigned from parliament because of the publicity given to his close relationship with the Tokyo *yakuza*.⁶⁸ Following the earlier disclosed scandals involving leading politicians, this was a near fatal blow to the status quo or old regime government. Following Kanemaru's departure, the Takeshita faction split over the issue of political reform. Murayama, who previously obtained the Prime Minister position with Kanemaru's support, was given a no confidence vote within a year forced him out of office after failure to institute the political reforms promised in his platform.

In conjunction with Miyazawa's defeat, the LDP experienced a major defection with the formation of two new parties from the disbanded Takeshita faction. They were the Shinseito or Japan Renewal Party and the Shinto Sakigake or New Pioneer Party. Following the 18 July 1992 general elections, these new parties were able to remove the LDP from power with the formation of a new alternative coalition government. Morihiro Hosokawa of the Japan New Party (JNP) was appointed Prime Minister while the real power of the Shinseito under Ichiro Ozawa's leadership secured five key cabinet positions.

This new coalition government propelled Japan into a new era of politics which was no longer centered around the "1955 political setup" dominated by the competition between the LDP and JSP coalitions. This major shift in Japanese politics from support of the status quo to a commitment to reform itself, entered Japan into a new era of change.⁶⁹

Abolishing the old multi-seat constituency system, Hosokawa successfully introduced proportional representation based on the German electoral system but witnessed his coalition

⁶⁸This political scandal was by no means Japan's first. The earlier Lockheed bribery scandal in the 1970s and the Recruit bribery case in 1989 had already linked Japan's politicians to the illegal practices of payoffs and influence buying. It was, however, the new international environment caused by the ending of the cold war, that allowed for greater attention to be placed on domestic politics.

⁶⁹Takeshi Sasaki, "Agenda for the Post-LDP Era," *Japan Review of International Affairs*, (Fall 1994), 291.

begin to splinter as he moved away from the popular issue of political reform. After coming under attack for participation in a corruption scandal, Hosokawa, while continually denying involvement, resigned on 8 April 1994 as Prime Minister. Right after replacing Hosokawa, Japan Renewal Party (JRP) co-founder Tsutomu Hata observed the exodus of the SDPJ and Sakigake from his coalition and on 25 June 1994, only 59 days after assuming office Hata was issued a vote of no-confidence and forced to resign. This once again sent Japanese politics into a spin as its Members of Parliament (MPs) attempted to form a functional coalition.

The result was the "grand coalition" between the LDP and SDPJ.⁷⁰ This arrangement in which the SDPJ leader Tomiichi Murayama would obtain the position of prime minister and the LDP would receive 13 out of the 20 key cabinet positions, was condemned by many political analysts as a "piece of political opportunism."⁷¹ The real linkage between the LDP and the SDPJ is their common dislike of Ichiro Ozawa and his reformist ideas which have threatened the political lives of both parties.⁷²

The desire to be in power has forced both parties to reverse their basic ideological disputes. This was clearly evident when Murayama rescinded many old SDPJ platform issues after rising to power. By 28 September 1994, in response to this government which is more interested in power than reforming itself, Ozawa had successfully formed an alliance among the nine non-communist parties not in power in order to challenge the LDP and SDPJ.⁷³

The new group later named the Shinshintō or New Frontier Party (NFP) is now the

⁷⁰The coalition also includes the small Sakigake reformist group which broke away from Hata's coalition with the SDPJ.

⁷¹"Japan," *Asia 1995 Yearbook*, 141.

⁷²Charles Smith, "Strange Bedfellows: Expediency Wins Out over Ideology in Coalition Politics" *Far Eastern Economic Review* (14 July 1994) 22-23.

⁷³Ozawa has been arguing for years that Japan needs a Western-style two-party system as a means of banishing factionalism and introducing "real debate" into politics. Source: Charles Smith, "Honeymoon's End: Prime Minister Murayama Suddenly Looks Vulnerable," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (13 October 1994) 28-29.

second largest group in Parliament, behind the LDP. Although organized by Ozawa, the Shinshinto does stand behind all of his policies and has been argued to have been formed due to Japan's new political funding legislation in which larger parties fare better than smaller ones. For this reason the NFP is perceived as a "warmed-up version of old political groupings - not a new party offering fresh policies."⁷⁴ The NFP has therefore been predicted to dissolve once political differences of opinion cause rifts in the party.

Meanwhile, a poll conducted in March 1995 indicated that support for the present cabinet fell to only twenty-seven percent. This is the lowest approval rating for a government since fall of LDP in 1992.⁷⁵ As political issues are ignored in formation of political alliances and parties, popularity for the present coalition and support of any political party continues to decrease. Japan's political future is, therefore, anything but stable and certain.

B. EFFECTS ON SECURITY POLICIES

In order to evaluate properly the impact of these four factors on Japan's reassessment of its national security strategy, a clear comprehension of Japan's Cold War defense posture is necessary in order to establish a starting point.

For the past half century, Japan's defense was centered around a reliance on the nuclear and conventional deterrence supplied by the United States. The blueprint for Japan's defense posture during the Cold War, the 1976 National Defense Program Outline (NDPO) was based on three major assumptions; first, major military clashes between East and West could be deterred by a balance of power, including the nuclear powers; second, there could be limited armed conflict in the vicinity of Japan; third, any major military attack on Japan is

⁷⁴Charles Smith, "Problem Child: Doubts Cloud Birth of New Opposition Grouping," *Far Eastern Economic Review* 22 December 1994) 16.

⁷⁵"'Non-Support' for Murayama Cabinet reaches 34 percent; First reversal of 'Support' at 27 percent; 'No Leadership any political party'; Results of Mainichi Public Survey," *Mainichi Shimbun*, 15 March 1995 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 17 March 1995) 4-6.

unlikely so long as the U.S.-Japan security arrangement remains functional.⁷⁶ The first assumption has been made invalid by the exit of the Soviet Union as a superpower from the international system, while the likelihood of the latter two has decreased significantly.

In conjunction with stating the importance of the security arrangement with the United States, the NDPO established force levels along with the general mission goals for the JDA.⁷⁷ The JDA was to be able to defend the Japanese home islands against a small scale invasion force, while U.S. forces would concentrate on fighting the brunt of the Soviet Far East forces thereby indirectly defending Japan by occupying or tying down the greatest threat. This concept was the driving rationale behind Japan's force structure and military buildup of the late 1970s and 1980s.

Although not explicitly stated in its Defense Program Outline, Japan remained committed to maintaining a purely defensive posture during the Cold War by not procuring weapon systems that would be used in the offensive role of power projection. The NDPO was therefore established for external as well as internal consumption by making Japan appear unthreatening to its Asian neighbors while also appeasing the United States through greater defense spending and burdensharing. Japan's military acquisitions have clearly steered away offensive weapons such as 1) Weapons of "Mass Destruction", 2) Long-Range Bombers, 3) Long-Range Ballistic Missiles, and 4) "Offensive" Aircraft Carriers.⁷⁸

In the mid-1980s, many academics and politicians became concerned with Japan's supposed military buildup. These assessments were primarily based on a comparison of

⁷⁶Michael D. Bellows, *Asia In The 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities* (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1994) 68.

⁷⁷A copy of the force levels is included in the appendix.

⁷⁸ The word offensive in front of aircraft carriers may lead to confusion since U.S. style aircraft carriers generally emphasize the mission of 'power projection.' It is believed that the discussions concerning offensive versus defensive aircraft carriers in Japanese defense think tanks are centered around future designs which would concentrate on extending Japan's fighter engagement range in defense of the home islands.

military expenditures between Japan and other nations. Due to Japan's militarist tendencies in the first half of this century, many Asian countries quickly became alarmed by the increases in Japan's defense spending. Fears over the reemergence of a militarist Japan were, however, more psychological than substance.

Although Japan had large defense expenditures, these expenditures do not directly correlate to the military procurement in other countries, due to its policy restrictions which contribute to Japan's procurement costs being greatly inflated. Japan's high labor costs and desire for only state-of-the-art equipment are also contributing factors in the distortion of this comparison.

The final section of the NDPO states that "attention should also be given to the possibility for adequate domestic production of the equipment in question." Over the years this statement has translated into approximately 80% of all Japanese military weapons and equipment being produced domestically. When this is coupled with the Ban on Arms Exports, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) is forced to purchase military equipment at prices two to three times higher than that available from foreign producers. This is simply due to the fact that Japan's defense industry cannot enjoy the same economies-of-scale with the small demand offered only by the JDA.⁷⁹

Upon closer examination of Japan's military capability in the absence of U.S. assistance, the JDA would have to greatly expand the SDF in order to be threatening to any other nation. The Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) is too small and does not possess the sea lift capability to project itself past its own coastline. It is no secret that the Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) and Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) procure state-of-the-art equipment for their forces. Because the relatively small ASDF possesses primarily fighters and surveillance aircraft, it does not have the ability to project power either.⁸⁰ The MSDF is,

⁷⁹Thomas L. Wilborn, *Japan's Self-Defense Forces: What Dangers to Northeast Asia?* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994) 14-16.

⁸⁰*Defense of Japan 1992*, 209.

of course, the exception to this trend with its size and caliber of ships making it larger than all other East Asian navies with the exception of Russia and China. The MSDF destroyers are primarily designed for Anti-Submarine Warfare and Sea Control missions. Without proper land-based air cover, however, they would be jeopardized if they attempted to stray far away from the home islands. With a limited ammunition supply, Japan also lacks the logistical infrastructure to support a major operation for more than a week, to say nothing of resupplying its forces deployed away from its own shores. It is easy to see that Japan's present military force poses no credible threat to the Asian community. In fact, its military may be too small to deter hostilities short of an invasion in the absence of the U.S. security agreement.

Having established Japan's Cold War Defense posture, the specific effects which the end of the Cold War, the Gulf War, the recession and change in domestic politics have had on Japan's perception of its international role will now be explored. As the Soviet Union's power steadily declined throughout Gorbachev's tenure, Japan attempted to reap the benefits of the new world order, thereby enhancing its global role.

The litmus test for Japan's resolve in playing a larger international role came quickly as Iraqi troops crossed the border into Kuwait. The ruling LDP government quickly put together a United Nations Peace Cooperation Bill, which would have allowed for the deployment of the SDF to the Gulf with the other multinational forces. This bill which was intended on overturning Japan's longstanding Ban on Overseas deployment, lacked the necessary support in the Upper House and therefore became shelved by the LDP in the Diet for nearly two years.⁸¹

On 19 December 1990 in the shadow of the Gulf Crisis, Japan released the Basic Policy on Defense Planning in and after FY 1991. This document while marking the

⁸¹Diet opposition also caused Prime Minister Kaifu to halt a plan for sending ASDF C-130s to ferry refugees from Jordan to Egypt immediately following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Source: John E. Endicott, "Japan," *The Defense Policies of Nations: A Comparative Study*, (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 1994) 352.

relaxation of tensions between East and West, reiterated the importance of the security agreement with the United States and the continued commitment to upgrading its forces. Released on the following day, the Mid-Term Defense Program (FY 1991-1995) called for a modest increase in military hardware basically to fill in the gaps and make the SDF a better all around force. In addition the Chief Cabinet Secretary stated that Japan would gradually increase its cost bearing burden for basic wages and utilities for the employees of the U.S. forces stationed in Japan until it comes to defray all the expenditures in FY1997. At the same time the JDA was intended on playing an active role in shaping the new world order, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu decided to limit annual increases in defense spending to less than three percent in addition to initiating a planned review within three years to address further defense budget cuts.⁸² This policy move exemplifies the friction existing between agencies in the government as each continue to envision a different role for Japan in the future international system.

With the Gulf War amplifying Japan's reluctance and inability to contribute militarily to the international community, in June 1992 Japan finally passed legislation allowing the SDF to participate in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) in an attempt to reverse this negative image.⁸³ When the recession hit Japan, it was obvious that new thinking was in order for Japan's security due to the increase in fiscal constraints. By December 1992 with Japan feeling the full effect of the recession, Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa cut ¥580 billion (\$5.8 billion) from the proposed defense budget giving the JDA less than a two percent annual increase. The savings were to occur by following the Security Council's revision of the Mid-

⁸²Barbara Wanner, "Japan Explores Restructuring its Self-Defense Capabilities," *Japan Economic Institute Report* (Washington: Japan Economic Institute [JEI] 38A, 7 October 1994) 3.

⁸³The "Law Concerning Cooperation for the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations" and the "Law to Amend Part of the Law Concerning the Dispatch of Japan Disaster Relief Team" provide the framework Japan's deployment of troops to Cambodia in September 1992. Source: *Defense of Japan 1994*, 117.

Term Defense Program (FY1991-1995) which called for sizeable reductions in equipment procurement .

Early in 1994 Prime Minister Hosokawa established a special advisory panel to deliberate on restructuring the NDPO into a more current document. The result, *The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century*, was presented to Prime Minister Murayama on 12 August 1994. The new comprehensive security strategy recommended rested upon three major pillars: multilateral cooperation, alliance with the United States, and a modern and efficient military.⁸⁴ Although Murayama eventually relaxed the long standing anti-military agenda of the SDP, he was not eager to embrace this analysis which was originated by the preceding government.

On 30 August 1994, the SDP released the draft of its new security policy, 'Challenge for Peace'. This document called for a basic restructuring and downsizing of the SDF over the next 10 years. Having a long anti-military history, the SDP planned across the board cuts which would affect all factions of the SDF. The 'limited defense' concept stated that Japan will "not have weapons and equipment (capable of) attacking other countries and not use its military capabilities outside its sovereign territory." The proposal also calls for a restructuring of the U.S.-Japan Security Agreement in which Japan would obtain a larger role and U.S. forces in Japan would decrease.⁸⁵ The conclusion of this policy measure, however, rests with the SDP maintaining its power in the government, an event which is questionable at best.

C. SUMMARY

Although Japan's defense budget has been increasing since 1975, it has been increasing at a somewhat slower rate. Seeing its smallest increase in 34 years (0.9%) in 1994, Japan's

⁸⁴Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, *Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program* (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1994) 7-8.

⁸⁵Kensuke Ebata, "Draft Proposal Edges Japan Toward Pacifism," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, v22 n10 (10 September 1994) 3.

defense budget has been following a general decreasing trend similar to that in the United States as the military is put to the test of supplying justification for Cold War funding levels in the less threatening post-Cold War world. With the previously anti-military, Social Democratic Party (SDP) coming to power in 1994, a call to hold military expenditures to an annual increase of 0.9% has been initiated. The Defense Minister's counter argument stated that a 2.8% increase was required to finance the projected ¥130 billion required in the 1991 burden-sharing agreement with the United States for its forces deployed in Japan.⁸⁶ With Japan still feeling the effects of the recession, a reversal in defense funding to transform the SDF into the modern and mobile force described in the *Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan* is not plausible in the near term.

The ending of the Cold War, the recession, and removal of the LDP from sole control of the government have all assisted in decreasing Japan's military budget from expected or predicted levels. With their being a domestic call for an increase in Japan's global role, the Japanese government, like many others, is placed in a catch twenty-two position. In order to play a larger role Japan would, in addition to reversing more of its anti-military policies, be required to increase its military capability greatly at the expense of fiscal budget constraints. If Japan wishes to obtain the true status of a world power, it must be prepared to accept the necessary social and fiscal costs for unilateral rearmament. Based on the present mood, it is not certain that the Japanese nation is willing to undertake such a commitment.

A more feasible course, which appears to be the direction it is presently heading, is where Japan would build a force which is designed to participate in United Nations (U.N.) Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Through PKO similar to those in Cambodia and Rwanda, Japan can enhance its international reputation in an attempt to reverse its negative image as an uninvolved nation placed upon it from the Gulf War. In its "Law Concerning Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and other Operations" Japan established five

⁸⁶"More on Defense Budget" *Kyodo* (25 July 1994) in *FBIS-EAS-94-142*, Daily Report 25 July 1994.

principles for its participation in UN PKO are shown in table (3).

**Basic Guidelines for Japan's Participation in Peacekeeping Forces
(The So-called Five Principles)**

- I. Agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties to the conflict.
- II. The parties to the conflict, including the territorial state(s), shall have given their consent to deployment of the peacekeeping force and Japan's participation in the force.
- III. The peacekeeping force shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any party to the conflict.
- IV. Should any of the above guideline requirements cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may withdraw its contingent.
- V. Use of Weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the personnel's lives, etc.

Source: *Defense of Japan 1994*, 118.

Table 3.

With the SDF participating in election monitoring in Cambodia and humanitarian assistance in Goma, Rwanda following the establishment of its principles, Japan's has demonstrated its commitment to maintaining international stability in other than merely financial means. Japan, however, has a long way to go in building international recognition for its contributions which may still be perceived as simply a token effort. Japan will need to enhance its peacekeeping and humanitarian capabilities in order to be a reliable contributor in future to U.N. operations. It is, therefore, in Japan's self interest to perpetuate the security relationship with the United States as it restructures its force into one better suited for peacekeeping operations. The continued U.S. presence will also assist in quelling concerns of a remilitarization in Japan by its neighbors. As long as the imminent threat on the Korean peninsula exists, the utility of the security agreement with the United States, particularly the deployment of U.S. troops on Japanese soil, will outweigh the costs.

V. CURRENT U.S. STRATEGY AND PENDING ISSUES

A new era is upon us. The Cold War is over. The dissolution of the Soviet empire has radically transformed the security environment facing the United States and our allies. The primary security imperative of the past half century -- containing communist expansion while preventing nuclear war -- is gone. We no longer face massive Soviet forces across an East-West divide nor Soviet missiles targeted on the United States. Yet there remains a complex array of new and old security challenges America must meet as we approach a new century.⁸⁷

As the United States seeks to carve its own path and shape the global agenda in the post Cold War period, the policies the United States undertakes in the near term will directly influence the global environment it faces in the next decade and century. The present global situation presents the United States with two main choices as to the direction for itself in the international community. One direction is to continue or enhance its world leadership role through direct involvement in global and other nation's affairs. A plausible strategy for the United States in this scenario would be for it to take a greater leadership role in the United Nations while directly allocating the necessary resources to each international issue or crisis to support its view. The other possible course would be one of neo-isolationism in which U.S. foreign policies would more closely resemble those of the post World War I era when the United States swayed away from international involvement and channelled its resources internally on more domestic concerns.

With the extreme choices of being either a benevolent world leader or an isolationist country having their own distinctive costs, the United States has currently chosen a path of

⁸⁷Opening paragraph of the White House white paper *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995) 1.

least resistance with a policy appropriately named "selective engagement."⁸⁸ Since the end of the Gulf War, the size and type of resources which the United States has contributed to international crises has diminished gradually due primarily to budget constraints and a lack of direct national interest. Recent budget constraints have been the main catalyst behind a reevaluating of the voluntary constraints erected in the shadows of the East-West confrontation.

Attention has therefore been placed on the U.S.-Japan security relationship as the United States seeks to modify this relationship in conjunction with its new evolving strategy. The direction the United States takes in its relationship with Japan will play a key role in determining the degree to which America is perceived as a true world leader or simply as a waning superpower in an increasingly multipolar world. These ongoing discussions over the reevaluation of the U.S.-Japan security relationship will also be critical to U.S. strategies not only in Asia but throughout the world.⁸⁹

The first section of this chapter will address the course of the present national strategy and its effects on U.S. influence in Japan and the East Asian Region. The U.S. National Security Strategy, the National Military Strategy and the U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region will be used to define the U.S. specific strategy for East Asia and Japan. The subsequent section will discuss the major issues of the ongoing United States-Japan Security Dialogue.

⁸⁸White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, 7.

⁸⁹The July/August 1995 issue of *Foreign Affairs* offers a point/counter-point argument for U.S. engagement in East Asia. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Joseph S. Nye Jr. presents a convincing case for deep U.S. engagement in Japan and East Asia by presenting five possible strategies for the United States with the present "Engagement and Enlargement" being the only logical choice. Academics Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn interpret the post Cold War world with a greater emphasis on economic versus military power. They believe the United States does not have the economic resources to compete with Asia while still providing the region with free defense and security and therefore suggest disengagement and isolationism. Source: "The U.S. in East Asia: Stay or Go? Two Views on Security." *Foreign Affairs* v74 n4 (July/August 1995) 90-117.

A. U.S. STRATEGY FOR EAST ASIA AND JAPAN

For four decades the United States maintained a consistent strategy focused around the containment of communism. With the breakup of the Soviet Union and subsequent elimination of any credible global threat, the U.S. government quickly scrambled to generate a new strategy based upon the new alignment of the international system. However, the post Cold War era has thus far only presented the United States with the adversary of uncertainty as there exists no clear consensus on the future direction of the international system and world. Many nations perceiving decreasing external threats, have turned greater attention towards domestic matters, thereby causing the need or desire for U.S. assistance and intervention to decrease markedly. The absence of the Cold War's East-West competition for allies has subsequently eroded U.S. influence throughout the world.⁹⁰ With this in mind the United States has initiated a National Security Strategy focused on forming an international system which will continue to be benevolent towards U.S. national interests and prosperity.⁹¹

The present strategy of Engagement and Enlargement articulated by the White House sets three main objectives to assist in creating the desired environment conducive to supporting our national interests. These objective are: (1) the enhancement of security, (2) the promotion of prosperity domestically and (3) the promotion of democracy internationally.⁹² Without direct or immediate threats to its sovereignty, and the increasing

⁹⁰Although some ex-Soviet Bloc nations openly ask for U.S. assistance, it is only financial aid which is truly desired.

⁹¹The "enduring national interest" which the National Security Strategy refers to is simply the extension of our mores or value system to a greater level. Using a realist perspective of the world, Americans feel that the same rights which apply to individuals within our nation, apply to our country within the international system or world. Americans feel that their country has the inherent right or freedom to act or conduct its affairs in any manner as long as it does not infringe on the rights of another nation.

⁹²The third goal, the promotion of democracy internationally, was only recently added to the national strategy by the Clinton Administration and is more rhetoric than

domestic concerns over budget deficits, the United States no longer has unlimited discretionary funds to allot to foreign aid for the purpose of enhancing its influence and world security. As budgetary responsibility has taken hold in the 1990s, the foreign aid and military budgets have decreased due to continually scrutinizing by Congress.

In hopes that self-imposed reductions would prevent even deeper cuts from outside agencies, the Department of Defense (DOD) has implemented the Bottom up Review, Downsizing and then Right-sizing policies initiatives. The resulting military force has been reduced to such a level that it can no longer maintain the overseas presence levels it once enjoyed during the Cold War. With the United States being unable to be financially and militarily engaged throughout the world, the opportunity for the United States to be able to play an intricate role in the structuring of the "new world order" may have past. This concern has resulted in the present political buzzword of "selective engagement" when it comes to the determination and implementation of foreign policy. No longer having sufficient resources to be directly involved in every key event throughout the world, the United States has resigned itself to only having an opinion on many issues, a situation similar to most other nations in the world. The United States will now only take action on those issues in which its national interests is the greatest.⁹³

Even in the shadow of a downsizing, the United States still maintains the world's preeminent military force. It is through the use or threat of use of this preponderant military force that the United States attempts to influence other nations throughout the world through this policy of selective engagement. By offering security agreements to the world's most

substance. Throughout its history the United States has continued to "look the other way" when critical allies and friends have had less than democratic forms of government. This third goal is based upon the incorrect assumption that "democracies do not go to war" and therefore should be disregarded as a feasible or sane policy for the United States.

⁹³The State Department's policy concerning Bosnia is a clear example of this phenomenon. Although the United States has strong opinions concerning policies in Bosnia, its the low level of direct national interest which plays the largest role in structuring the U.S. level and type of involvement in the region.

industrialized nations, the United States hopes to alleviate internal pressures within those countries to unilaterally arm themselves to such a level that they threaten to undermine U.S. global and regional power. This type of policy has successfully worked in the past with Japan and Germany as well as most other NATO nations. Through the "collective security" agreement of NATO, European countries were able to curb their defense spending while feeling secure about their neighbor's military power. This was only possible, however, under the nuclear/security umbrella of the United States which also stood as the central figure around which the others rallied. This umbrella which is now being perceived as 'unnecessary and unwanted' by European countries may not have the cohesiveness it once did in holding alliances together.

The challenge facing the United States in Asia is clear enough: to design a strategy that minimizes threats to peace and security, promotes economic and political development, and maximizes opportunities for American business to benefit from the region's economic growth.⁹⁴

1. Enhancement of Security

Although the primary responsibility of the U.S. armed forces is to be ready and able to fight and win the nation's wars, it is more feasible that the military will continue to perform the mission of deterrence as it had throughout the Cold War. It can be argued that the United States has not been involved in a large scale war since 1945.⁹⁵ The invention of nuclear weapons has restricted military warfare to be conducted within particular limits throughout

⁹⁴Gerald L. Curtis, "Meeting the Challenge of Japan in Asia," *The United States, Japan, and Asia* (New York: Norton, 1994) 232.

⁹⁵The military operations in Korea, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf over the past half century, all occurred without a declaration of war by the U.S. Congress. It can, therefore, be argued that these actions were an intermediate level military commitment between deterrence and general war, due to the ceasing of hostilities without a definitive victor and the elimination of the declared enemy.

the second half of this century. It is therefore surmised that future conflicts will continue to be of a limited military nature.

The National Military Strategy published by the Department of Defense (DOD) calls for flexible and selective engagement of military forces in pursuit of national political aims. By focusing the implementation of military force to key nodes and/or times, direct U.S. involvement in any given situation can be minimized thereby reducing overall casualties and commitment. This is based upon the belief that democracies (i.e. the United States) in conflicts short of total war, become less willing to make the necessary sacrifices to conduct military operations, the longer and more costly these operations become.

By maintaining a technologically advanced and highly trained military force, DOD believes that it can dictate the conditions under which U.S. forces will be involved. The key difference between the U.S. and other country's military forces in conducting operations is in the realm of deployment away from the motherland. Although maintaining the world's largest air and sea capability, the United States armed forces fear that overseas deployment and bases will continue to shrink from their Cold War levels to a point at which our degree of influence will be severely hampered.

Based on a belief that aggression is deterred and that strategic interests are enhanced by the overseas presence of military forces, the United States has continually sought to deploy its military forces abroad in peacetime and engage in as many bilateral and multilateral exercises as possible. Overseas basing of troops a material is not only seen as a force multiplier in crisis reaction time but as a necessity for keeping force requirements and costs at a minimum. Since the United States has maintained bases or coaling stations in the Pacific since the end of the Spanish-American War, the military has grown accustomed to the enhanced deployment and force projection which these bases provide. This explains the quick expansion of facilities in Singapore upon the closing of Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines.

With the United States seeing itself as the supplier of oxygen (security) to East Asia,⁹⁶ it strongly desires to continue the ability to deploy military forces in the region in order to provide a credible stabilizing presence. This overseas presence is not only seen as a commitment to allies and friends but also as a deterrence against aggression and an advancement of U.S. interests. Joseph S. Nye Jr. stated:

Our security strategy for Asia rests on three pillars: our alliances, in particular with Japan, the Republic of Korea and Australia, our forward military presence, and our participation in multilateral dialogue.⁹⁷

In the absence of any present threat, the White House is interested in maintaining good security relations with Japan as it attempts to stave off the emergence of any regional powers in the Pacific Rim which may threaten America's level of influence in the region.⁹⁸ The present treaties and security agreements with Japan offers the greatest utility within the enhancement of security pillar of the National Security Strategy, due to the geographic location of Japan and the level of host nation support for our military forces in the region.

U.S.-Japan relations have primarily been focused on security in the past, yet with our three-pronged strategy greatly intertwined throughout East Asia and the Pacific region, U.S. relations with Japan play an intricate role across the spectrum of international affairs and are

⁹⁶"Security is like oxygen: you do not tend to notice it until you begin to lose it. The American security presence has helped provide this 'oxygen' for East Asian development." Source: Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995) 1.

⁹⁷Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "American Security Strategy for East Asia and the US-Japan Security Alliance," Speech given at Pacific Forum CSIS/JIIA Conference, San Francisco, 29 March 1995.

⁹⁸This strategy was evident in the U.S. handling of Libya and Iraq in the 1980s and 1990s respectively.

not limited to the issue of security.⁹⁹ The United States, therefore, seeks to continue its close relationship with Japan and all other countries where it has major economic ties that translate into vital national interest.

2. Prosperity at Home

"In thinking about Asia, we must remember that security is the first pillar of our new Pacific community."¹⁰⁰ It is, however, the economic importance of the region which has concerned the Clinton administration the most. The strategic importance of this region will continue to increase in conjunction with its economic growth as estimates that the Asia-Pacific region will become the center of the world economy and production in the 21st century.¹⁰¹ It is strongly suggested that it was the presence and engagement of the U.S. military in East Asia and the Pacific which has allowed for the "economic miracle" to occur in Japan and the four Asian Tigers. Over the past decades, with thirty-seven percent of America's trade occurring within this region, its continued stability is vital for our own prosperity.¹⁰²

When looking at Asia economically, it is difficult to notice anything that exists outside the shadow that Japan has cast over the region. Being second in the world only to the United States, Japan is the leading economic power in Asia with many neighboring nations linking their currencies to the value of the Japanese yen. With Japan's level of investment in Asia being more than double that of the United States and margin between the two growing

⁹⁹White House, *A National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement*, 28.

¹⁰⁰White House, *A National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement*, 28.

¹⁰¹Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), *Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition*, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995) 18.

¹⁰²Charles R. Larson, Admiral USN, "Pacific Command's Cooperative Engagement: Advancing U.S. Interests" *Military Review* v74 n4 (April 1994) 5-6.

annually, American firms have been concerned that they will be "crowded out" of the Pacific technology basin" by their Japanese counterparts.¹⁰³ When looking at the economic potential of China, U.S. and Japanese firms find themselves as adversaries in a competition to invest in this perceived goal mine of the 21st century.

B. UNITED STATES-JAPAN SECURITY DIALOGUE

With recent concerns about Japan being more interested in Asia versus the United States and the West, the Departments of Defense and State have undertaken an initiative to enhance the present relationship with Japan. Although the United States has attempted to pressure Japan concerning the trade imbalance which has existed for decades, the past three years have seen a dramatic increase in economic ultimatums from the United States government. In order to not have economic differences jeopardize a security relationship which has been in existence for the last half century, the United States has continued to "market" the concept that our relationship with Japan is like a stool with three legs. These three legs, being our security alliance, political cooperation, and economics and trade, are distinctively separate and equal.

With the United States possessing a preponderance of military power, it follows that the military factor will have a strong influence on economic negotiations. Without adequate attention to this fact, DOD is handicapped in trying to distance itself from economic issues while negotiating security affairs.

With its origin in the Assistant Secretary of Defense Office of International Security Affairs, a policy initiative was envisioned which brought together all the ongoing issues in the security arena. By consolidating all security related issues concerning Japan into one single thrust, the United States is attempting to display its commitment to maintaining stability in the region and positive security relations with Japan.

¹⁰³Erza F. Vogel, "Japan as Number One in Asia" *The United States, Japan and Asia* (New York: Norton, 1994) 159.

Originally called the "Nye Initiative" after Assistant Secretary of Defense, Joseph S. Nye Jr., the goal of these talks was to reassure Japan that the United States still values the alliance.¹⁰⁴ To ease the discussions and debates, the U.S.-Japan Security Dialogue was separated into the following distinctive levels of talks: Bilateral, Regional and Global. The specific issues of the dialogue are addressed in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

1. Bilateral Issues

In looking at the security relationship as it stands, neither side desires to rewrite the letter of the law and agreement, yet both seek to agree on a new interpretation of the alliance which would more closely match post-Cold War conditions. The United States has continually looked towards Japan for it to increase its share of the military burden when countering the Soviets throughout the Cold War. With the Cold War behind us, it is, now, Japan that seeks to increase its role in this security partnership. The United States sees Japan's increased role falling within the bounds of the present security agreement. Through closer integration of the JSDF and U.S. Forces in East Asia, the United States envisions a joint Japanese-U.S. force providing stability and security in the region.¹⁰⁵ Through the division of labor, Japan would concentrate on the defense of the home islands and sea lanes out to 1000 nautical miles while the United States would continue to provide its power projection and nuclear deterrence capability.¹⁰⁶

It is not plausible that Japan, hidden behind pacifist military policies for decades,

¹⁰⁴Daniel Williams, "Rebuilding Military Ties to Tokyo; 'Nye Initiative' Launched to Address Post-Cold War Security Concerns," *Washington Post*, 19 February 1995, A48, and "America, Japan and the Unmentionable," *The Economist*, v334 n7903 (25 February 1995) 33-34.

¹⁰⁵A similarity can be drawn to France's security relationship with Germany. French fears of a rearmed Germany are quelled through close integration of both forces within NATO.

¹⁰⁶DOD, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, 25.

would exceed such a military commitment in the near future. A dramatic change in the Japanese public is first required before its leaders can pursue a larger international role. This task which the present and future Japanese politicians must undertake of dramatically changing public opinion is by no means a small feat.

The most volatile issues in the bilateral discussions are those centered around reducing the footprint made by United States Armed Forces in Japan. As Japanese citizens peer through the fences surrounding U.S. facilities, they notice the tremendous amount of living space afforded to the Americans. Of the 100,000 U.S. troops committed to East Asia and Pacific region, approximately 45,000 are permanently based in Japan.¹⁰⁷ With about seventy-five percent of all American military bases in Japan being concentrated on the island of Okinawa, most discussions concerning U.S. bases usually gravitate to those U.S. facilities which occupy nearly fifty percent of the small island. In December 1994, Prime Minister Murayama stated that the Okinawa base issues "need to be settled in haste, while considering changes in the international situation, and the Okinawan residents' feelings."¹⁰⁸ Okinawa Governor Masahide Ota desires to change Okinawa's dark image of being an island of military bases to an image of a cultural prefecture by completely removing all U.S. forces from Okinawa.¹⁰⁹ While U.S.-Japan talks continued on the issue of relocating or downsizing the U.S. naval facilities at Naha, Governor Ota argued for the complete and unconditional removal of U.S. forces from the facility.¹¹⁰ The Naha naval port is the primary embark and debark location for the U.S. Marines based on Okinawa. To completely close these facilities

¹⁰⁷Department of Defense, *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992) 23.

¹⁰⁸"Beginning of a Solution: The Japan-U.S. Summit Agreement on Bases in Okinawa," *Ryukyu Shimpo*, Tokyo, FBIS-EAS-95-010, 17 January 1995, 11.

¹⁰⁹"Murayama Wants to Scale Down U.S. Military," *Kyodo*, Tokyo, FBIS-EAS-95-010 17 January 1995, 10.

¹¹⁰"Okinawa Governor on Relocating Naha Naval Port," *Okinawa Times*, Naha, FBIS-EAS-95-017, 24 January 1995, 3.

would significantly hamper the Third Marine Expeditionary Force (3rd MEF) in the performance of their mission of deterring the DPRK by the existence of a ready and capable amphibious force in the region. U.S. officials, while agreeing that some facilities should be turned over to the Okinawans, believe that Governor Ota's extreme and radical demands are more politically than logically driven. This assumption is based upon the negative economic impact that would result from the complete removal of all U.S. forces from the island.

Although consolidation or moving facilities on Okinawa occupy most of the discussions concerning U.S. bases, they are by no means limited only to the Ryukyu Islands. In April 1994, the "21st Century Committee" of the LDP drafted a new platform of policies concerning a qualitative and quantitative change in the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. One proposal was for the return of Yokota Air Base which occupies vast land in a suburb of Tokyo for civil not military aviation uses.¹¹¹

Japanese public concerns over U.S. bases frequently transcends the single issue of land ownership to also include the operations which are conducted at these facilities. Due to domestic complaints of excessive noise pollution over night landing practices at Atsugi Naval Air Station located on the Kanto plain near Tokyo, Japan established facilities on Iwo Jima for use by U.S. naval aircraft during training. According to the Defense Facilities Administration Agency (DFAA), Japan will pay part of the costs associated with U.S. carrier-borne aircraft training on the island of Iwo Jima. Due to the additional costs incurred in conducting this training away from aircraft home base in Atsugi, the United States asked Japan to assist in the relocation of personnel and equipment during training operations. The DFAA stated that Japan will cover costs related to the following three elements: (1) the transport expense for tanker carrying air fuel, (2) the indirect expenses such as for providing meals and administering compounds, and (3) the fuel expense for the ASDF C-130 transport

¹¹¹"Japan's Choices -- 50 years after the End of World War II: Cold Peace (Part 4) U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) Now Standing at Crossroads," *Mainichi Shimbun*, Tokyo 15 March 1995, (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 24 March 1995) 8.

aircraft carrying American military officers.¹¹² This type of financial assistance clearly indicates the value Japan places on the existence of U.S. forces and the level of contribution it is willing to make in order to ensure their continued presence and readiness.

The final issue in U.S.-Japan bilateral discussions focuses on the joint reduction of costs for outfitting and maintaining of military forces. In addition to reducing overall costs through drawing on lessons learned from joint appropriations and training of its four major services, the United States desired closer integration between DOD and the JDA. Erza Vogel, tasked with East Asian affairs at the U.S. National Intelligence Council (NIC), an advisory board to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), has cited the "exchange of intelligence" as a key element in "redefining the U.S.-Japan security arrangement" in the future.¹¹³ Although the sharing of spy satellite photography is proof of past intelligence exchanges, both nations desire closer integration of resources and expertise. The JDA plans to reinforce its present intelligence and policy capability by creating two new support organizations. It hopes that a "defense-policy bureau" and an "intelligence headquarters" will assist in bringing the JDA closer in line with its U.S. and U.K. brethren.¹¹⁴ The mirroring of U.S. and Japanese defense agencies is expected to facilitate the sharing of intelligence and information between the two nations.

¹¹²"Defense Facilities Administration Agency's Policy Line: To Shoulder the Costs of U.S. Forces' Training, Will Make up Difference in Connection with Relocation of Place for Training to Iwo Jima: Argument over Collective Self-Defense Right Likely to Occur," *Tokyo Shimbun*, 19 April 1995 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press: American Embassy, Tokyo, 21 April 1995) 4.

¹¹³"Japan's Choices -- 50 years after the End of World War II: Cold Peace (Part 3); Changing Nature of Japan-United States Intelligence Exchanges; To 'Bring together as One Perceptions of Unstable Elements'; Secrets Also Shared, Focusing on Possible Redefinition of Security Alliance," *Mainichi*, 14 March 1995 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, 23 March 1995) 8.

¹¹⁴"Self Defense Force (SDF) Emerges from the Cradle," *Nikkei Business*, 31 October 1994 (Japanese Magazine Review: American Embassy, Tokyo, November 1994) 9.

The area of arms procurement offers hope for future savings in both nations by reaching greater economies of scale in eventual production. Unless considerable headway is made in the area of technology for technology (TFT) transfers, true savings will be marginal at best.¹¹⁵ After years of controversy over the development of the follow-on jet fighter (FSX), Japan has been left with a bad taste in its mouth as to U.S. sincerity in the technology transfer realm. Watching the United States bow out of production while still demanding exorbitant prices and tight controls for U.S. copyrighted technology, Japan's Defense Industry found itself in a very undesirable position. After spending over billions of yen on the designing and developing of the FSX, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) now has no plans for production past test flights next summer. By not producing the fighter, the technology accumulated through trial and error will be for naught.¹¹⁶

These setbacks have however not deterred Japan's aviation and defense industries. The JDA plans to develop a demonstration-model aircraft with technology for next-generation fighter planes, aiming at the year 2008. The model, expecting to have stealth and fly-by-light control technologies, will greatly exceed the present capabilities of the F-15, the JSDF's mainstay fighter plane.¹¹⁷ This will hopefully place Japan in a better bargaining position in future technology transfer negotiations.

In addition to aviation procurement, the other difficult area in U.S.-Japan bilateral discussions is the continued exploration into the construction of a Theater Missile Defense (TMD) system. Having its evolution as part of the U.S. "Star Wars" program, TMD was

¹¹⁵Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, *Redefining The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program*, (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, November 1994) 13.

¹¹⁶"Self Defense Force (SDF) Emerges from the Cradle" 8.

¹¹⁷"Next-Generation Fighter: JDA, Aircraft Manufactures to Develop Demonstration Model with Domestic Technologies, Aiming at 2008; Projecting Follow-on Model to Replace F-15," *Nihon Keizai*, 3 September 1994, (Daily Summary of Japanese Press: American Embassy , Tokyo, 3-6 September 1994) 3-4.

expected to shield Japan from ballistic missile attacks. U.S. expected benefits from the deployment and development of TMD would be great due to the funds received from Japan for weapon systems and technology. Although the introduction of the THAAD (theater high-altitude area defense) and ERLINT (improved Patriot) missiles were displayed in Japan with great response, the issue of theater missile defense (TMD) remains up in the air. The extent to which Japanese manufactures will be allowed to carry out home production under licensing once initial proto-types are purchased remains an issue of contention between Japanese and U.S. business and government officials.¹¹⁸

In addition to the exorbitant cost to Japan, which is not in the present financial or political position to fund it, TMD has the difficult issue of technology transfer once again rearing its ugly head between the two nations. For the most part, the bilateral security discussions between the United States and Japan are simple and clear cut until they cross over the line into the economic relationship.

2. Regional and Global Issues

With the security alliance being the "linchpin of United States security policy in Asia," Japan is critical to both our region and global strategic objectives.¹¹⁹ With continued stability being a key rallying point for most nations in the Asian Pacific Region, the United States has the goals of transparency and enhanced cooperation between the Pacific nations. Although a multilateral security agreement may be unattainable goal in this region due to the historical inclinations of its nations, an Asian Security Dialogue between them can be helpful in alleviating future issues of contention before they become serious.

The perception that the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) will evolve into anything

¹¹⁸"Japan's Choices -- 50 Years after the End of World War II: Cold Peace (Part 7): Under the Name of TMD: 'The Last Huge Weaponry Sales Battle of This Century'; Domestic Trading Houses and Makers Running About," *Sankei*, 18 March 1995 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press: American Embassy, Tokyo, 29 March 1995) 7-8.

¹¹⁹DOD, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*, 10.

more than simply a means of diplomatic exchange, is unfounded and incorrect. It does, however, allow for an open exchange on security issues and national intentions which can assist in the easing of tensions in the region. In strongly agreeing with the recommendations issued in the *United States Security Strategy for East Asia-Pacific Region*, Japan also expects regional dialogues and exchanges to serve as the base for future multilateral cooperation.

Presently, Japan is promoting mutual visits by cabinet ministers and high-ranking officials, to include the JDA Chairman, in addition to those by working-level officials with its neighbors. The JDA is attempting to become more deeply engaged in Asia through the promotion of numerous endeavors which include: military instructor, student and observer exchanges, research exchanges, mutual visits by naval ships and aircraft, and the carrying out of joint training for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, the JDA intends to increase the transparency of its defense policy and budget, and will conclude an agreement for the purpose of preventing sea lanes air accidents.¹²⁰ The ongoing debate concerning the current interpretation of the Constitution regarding the participation in multilateral regional security system as unconstitutional, must first be resolved before Japan can reach a greater level of regional involvement.¹²¹ Since the Japan-U.S. security structure is the backbone of Japan's security, the JDA intends to remain in close liaison with the United States concerning the fine-tuning of its dialogue with other nations.

In shifting to more global issues, the United States and Japan once again have very similar opinions on restricting the existence of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The

¹²⁰"Japan to Promote Security Dialogue with Asia: JDA Groping for Stability after Cold War: Multilateralism with 'Japan-U.S.' Security Relationship as Axis," *Asahi Shimbun*, Tokyo, 13 March 1995 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, 14 March 1995) 1.

¹²¹"Japan's Choices -- 50 Years after the End of World War II: Cold Peace (Part 1): JDA Moving toward Reviewing the Current Interpretation of Regarding 'Collective-Self Defense Right' as Violation of Constitution; Secret Discussion Underway, Envisaging a Review of Such Interpretation," *Mainichi*, 12 March 1995 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 18-20 March 1995) 7-8.

vivid and remaining memories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have made Japan one of the leading supporters of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Recently Japan announced that it will reduce the amount of financial assistance to China for fiscal 1995 in order to protest China's recent nuclear testing. The United States and Japan are also in bed together as strong supporters of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).

Discussions are presently underway to determine the best means of establishing export controls in order to avoid the proliferation of strategic goods that could eventually be used in weapons production. The major issues being discussed are: (1) the adjustment of existing export control systems, such as the MTCR, (2) the management of these systems, and (3) the issuing of assistance to developing countries in Asia for improving or establishing export controls.¹²²

Before attempting to increase its role in the international system, Japan, first, must eliminate the international opinion that it only knows how to conduct "checkbook diplomacy" and is willing to employ a "human contribution" to international crises. Although the world's largest economic aid donor, Japan has decided to ease up on its push for a permanent position on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).¹²³ Understanding that respect must be earned and not demanded, Japan desires to increase its participation in United Nations Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Relief operations. Following the JSDF's first major

¹²²"Japan and United States Agree to work together for Weapons Export Control: To Reinforce Application of Four Restrictions as well as Assisting Asian Countries in their Improving or Setting up Exports Control System: Periodic Talks will Start next Month," *Nihon Keizai*, 13 March 1995, (Daily Summary of Japanese Press: American Embassy, Tokyo, 14 March 1995) 2-3.

¹²³In a recent speech to the Diet, Prime Minister Murayama has relaxed his rhetoric in his quest for a UNSC seat for Japan. Recent debate among MPs over the UN's competency has hindered Japan in the presenting a united front in support of a permanent seat. Source: "Murayama's Policy Speech Omits UNSC Seat Issue," *Asahi Shimbun* (21 January 1995) in *FBIS-EAS-95-014*, Daily Report 23 January 1995.

deployment in support of the U.N. Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1993, it was discovered that the highly professional and capable JSDF is well suited for such operations and need only to gain more experience through further deployments.¹²⁴ Recently, Japan has sent a fact-finding team named the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force Survey Mission to Syria, Jordan and Israel to evaluate the feasibility of deploying JSDF troops to the Golan Heights in support of United Nations Peacekeeping operations (PKO).¹²⁵ The United States maintains a very enthusiastic opinion concerning the involvement of Japan in PKO. The United States is willing to assist Japan with logistical support in any U.N. PKO it desires to undertake. In the realm of humanitarian relief, the recent earthquake near Kobe clearly showed that there is much room for improvement in the coordination of U.S. support to the JSDF. Although the United States Forces in Japan (USFJ) were completely mobilized within three hours of the execution order, Japanese officials being reluctant to openly accept outside assistance ended up delaying USFJ aid for two days.¹²⁶

Regionally and globally, the United States and Japan are very near agreement in all diplomatic matters. It is in the realm of military operations in support of a united front which requires fine tuning. The desired integration of U.S. and Japanese forces will of course occur over time as experience in both forces is increased.

¹²⁴Andrew H.N. Kim, "Japan and Peacekeeping Operations," *Military Review*, v74 n4 (April 1994) 30-32.

¹²⁵"Hayakawa Will Head Fact-Finding Mission for PKO on Golan Heights," *Nihon Keizai*, 25 March 1995 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 30 March 1995) 6.

¹²⁶"Japan's Choices -- 50 Years after the End of World War II: Cold Peace (Part 4) U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) Now Standing at Crossroads; Smoldering 'Argument Insisting on No Need for Japan-U.S. Security Treaty'; USFJ's Public Relations Campaign on Its Presence, Citing Quick Response to Earthquake Disaster," *Mainichi*, 15 March 1995, (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 24 March 1995) 8.

VI. CONCLUSION

Before the U.S.-Japan relationship can be redefined for the post Cold War era, a consensus of the present direction of the international system must first be reached. With opinions ranging from greater global interdependence to anarchy in both security and economic outlooks, the United States and Japan are faced with the task of strengthening their relationship. This new alliance must be sufficiently flexible to cope with the uncertain future.

In the United States, a "disliking of Japan," which was generated by recent upsurges of arguments regarding Japan as unfair, has proliferated and overshadowed the bilateral security relationship. Recognizing that if trade tensions are left to fester, they can undermine the overall relationship Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord made the following remarks. "The Japan-U.S. security relationship has progressed in a healthy and productive way in spite of difficulties in the economic area. The two countries should not have their trade discord affect other positive areas."¹²⁷

The United States and Japan are planning to deliver a joint statement declaring their post Cold War bilateral cooperation at their scheduled bilateral summit to follow the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Osaka in November 1995.

A. AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

With the end of the Cold War, the traditional U.S. national strategy of containment became obsolete. Being perceived as the victor, the United States began to downsize its military as it had following all other major conflicts in this century. By refocusing of national agenda from issues of security to ones of economics, the United States sought a "new world order" in which the growth in capitalist ideas would cause nations to become economically

¹²⁷"U.S.' Asia Policy: Powerfully Pushing Ahead with Security Dialogue; U.S. Aiming to Ease Tensions with Confidence Building Measures as Leverage: Politico-Economic Approach Somewhat Pragmatic; Repairing Relations with China is Key," *Tokyo Shimbun*, 21 July 1995 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 28 July 1995) 5-6.

interdependent on each other. The theory of economic MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) would cause countries to seek peaceful resolutions to differences, thereby greatly decreasing the likelihood of war and conflict throughout the world. This optimistic view of the world, of course, had the United States acting as a benevolent hegemon. Occurrences in former Yugoslavia, Kuwait and North Korea, however, quickly clouded this euphoric outlook.

As the United States continued to turn towards more domestic concerns following the lack of success in Somalia and its lack of action in Bosnia, its international reputation became that of a waning disinterested superpower. Concerns in Japan quickly arose as to U.S. resolve for the continuance of the Mutual Security and Cooperation Treaty (MSCT) and subsequent defense of Japan. As the Department of Defense (DOD) saw a key spoke in its security wheel begin to weaken, it initiated actions for its immediate reinforcement. The U.S.-Japan Security Dialogue is attempting to redefine and strengthen the relationship which has suffered from neglect.

B. JAPANESE ANTI-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE

Throughout the Cold War, the United States continued to pressure Japan to increase its military role in support of the strategy of containment. Not desiring to make itself a target, Japan surrounded itself with anti-military policies in order to appear non-threatening to the Soviets and other nations as it appeased the United States through larger financial commitments. Understanding that Japan was too valuable in America's eyes to be left unprotected, Japanese leaders felt secure behind the protection of an American shield.

Upon the ending of the Cold War, U.S. military and security policies towards Japan have seemingly reversed their course. During the Cold War, the United States pushed for Japan to become militarily strong so that it could stand next to the United States as an ally in the Pacific theater. This partnership could be considered similar to that between the United States and the United Kingdom with the Soviet Union during World War II. The British and American strategy was for the Soviets to absorb casualties on Germany's eastern front, thereby conserving eventual allied losses on the western front. No longer needing Japan as

a partner against communism, the United States now desires that Japan not become a military power matching economic prowess.

Being that the JSDF is more than capable of protecting the home islands from invasion, continued growth in the JSDF would only threaten U.S. relative power in Asia and the world. By desiring the continuance of the MSCT, the United States is attempting to weave a web of entangling relationships around Japan in order to inhibit its ability to act unilaterally. With this intensive security dialogue taking nearly a year to complete, Joseph S. Nye Jr. stated that it will take an even longer time to end the relationship which is now being formed.¹²⁸ This hints at the fact that closer relations will indirectly extend the one year notice required to abolish the MSCT.

Security redefining is perceived simply as theoretical arming against opinions that continuation of the MSCT is unnecessary. A U.S. Government official said, "it is vitally important to put Japan on the 'yoke' of security from now on, as well to block the way to Japan's independent defense."¹²⁹ The close integration of the JSDF and U.S. forces will only increase Japan's reliance on the United States as the JSDF becomes more specialized and dependent.

Arguing that the economic development which has occurred in Japan and Asia was the result of decades of stability, the United States seeks to accept credit for this stability by linking it to the forward presence of its military forces. The United States has even gone so far as to ask Japan to subsidize the deployment and operation of U.S. forces in and around Japan. An Australian Ambassador stated that "jobs seek security, and security promises regional stability. In short, the Clinton administration's Asia commitment is to link the U.S. economy to the growing market of Asia."¹³⁰

¹²⁸"U.S.' Asia Policy: Powerfully Pushing Ahead with Security Dialogue," 5-6.

¹²⁹"Japan, U.S. Beginning to 'Redefine' Bilateral Security Arrangement," *Asahi*, 3 June 1995 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 10-12 June 1995) 6.

¹³⁰"Japan, U.S. Beginning to 'Redefine' Bilateral Security Arrangement," *Asahi*, 6.

By advocating that China has the potential to become a serious threat to stability and prosperity in the 21st century, the United States argued that the security agreement must continue in order to prevent or contain this threat. China's rapid economic growth has increased its importance to the United States as a trading partner and investment target, but in a broader sense China looms smaller on America's global map than it did during the Cold War.¹³¹ China's forces are so large that even modest and essentially defensive changes in their size or character are likely to appear threatening to its neighbors. Being that China is so far behind the industrial powers technologically and doctrinally that it understandably feels compelled to take steps that will be far from 'modest and essentially defensive' in character. It is unlikely that any outside power can stop China's slow but steady drive to modernize.¹³² When compared to the United States Japan must be more appeasing and less adversarial towards China, thereby not linking itself to the hardline position normally taken by the United States.

C. PLAUSIBLE OUTCOME

This anti-American interpretation of U.S.-Japan relations is, however, not shared by the present ruling coalition. Disarmament is the present symbol of the Murayama Administration. When coupled with the "hollowing out" of Japan's defense power as a result of defense spending cuts carried out by the Miyazawa and Hosokawa cabinets, Japan is not in the position to ignore U.S. desires to redefine the security agreement.¹³³ LDP National Defense Division Chief Yoshinori Ohno, however, adds, "security redefining is difficult in the

¹³¹Curtis, "Meeting the Challenge of Japan in Asia," 229

¹³²Thomas L. McNaughter, "U.S. Military Forces in East Asia: The Case for Long-Term Engagement," *The United States, Japan, and Asia*, 202.

¹³³"Defense Capability Hollowing Out (Part 1): Distortions Resulting from Budget Retrenchment; No Money for Even Vehicles...; Shortages Reach 40 Percent," *Sankei*, 14 December 1994 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 21 December 1994) 11.

scheme of the present government."¹³⁴

Even by anticipating an anti-American perspective in negotiations, logic leads to the same conclusion that Japan will be extremely receptive to U.S. goals since the alternative of unilateral rearmament is not economically feasible nor politically viable at present. The common interests that bind Japan and the United States beyond the Cold War stem from their positions of having the world's largest economies and of leading overseas trading nations.¹³⁵

Japan struggles with the unresolved question of how to become a leader in the preservation of world security without dispatching its forces abroad. This struggle leads Japanese leaders to continue to lean on the United States for assistance. A break in the security relationship would serve neither the United States, Japan nor East Asia.

Willing to stand by Japan as it continues to search for its identity in the international system, the United States, however, cannot decide for the Japanese people the level and degree of Japanese participation. While the United States may pressure Japan to take a larger role in maintaining stability, it offers only the option of becoming more closely tied to the United States. In all likelihood, the Japanese will continue to sacrifice self reliance to the necessity of paying the ever increasing American subsidies.

¹³⁴"Japan, U.S. Beginning to 'Redefine' Bilateral Security Arrangement," *Asahi*, 7.

¹³⁵Ezra F Vogel, "Japanese-American Relations After the Cold War," *Daedalus*, v121 n4 (Fall 1992) 48.

APPENDIX A. TREATY OF MUTUAL COOPERATION AND SECURITY BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES

The United States of America and Japan,

Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship traditionally existing between them, and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law,

Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation between them and to promote conditions of economic stability and well-being in their countries,

Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments,

Recognizing that they have the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter of the United Nations,

Considering that they have a common concern in the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East,

Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual cooperation and security,
Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-loving countries to strengthen the United Nations so that its mission of maintaining international peace and security may be discharged more effectively.

ARTICLE II

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between them.

ARTICLE III

The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed attack.

ARTICLE IV

The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened.

ARTICLE VI

Each Party, recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

ARTICLE VI

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

The use of these facilities and areas as well as the status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty between Japan and the United States of America, signed at Tokyo on February 28, 1952, as amended, and by such other arrangements as may be agreed upon.

ARTICLE VII

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.

ARTICLE VIII

This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of America and Japan in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will enter into force on the date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them in Tokyo.

ARTICLE IX

The Security Treaty between the United States of America and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8, 1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this treaty.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinion of the Governments of the United States of America and Japan there shall have come into force such United Nations arrangements as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.

However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after notice has been given.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigner Plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty.

Done in duplicate at Washington in the English and Japanese languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of January, 1960.

For the United States of America:

CHRISTIAN A. HERTER

DOUGLAS MACARTHUR 2ND

J GRAHAM PARSONS

For Japan:

NOBUSUKE KISHI

AIICHIRO FUJIYAMA

MITSUJIRO ISHII

TADASHI ADACHI

KOICHIRO ASAKAI

APPENDIX B. NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM OUTLINE

<u>FORCE LEVELS</u>		
	Self-Defense Personnel Quota	180,000 Men
GSDF	Basic Units Units deployed regionally Mobile Operation Units Low-Altitude Ground-to-Air Missile Units	12 Divisions 2 Combined Brigades 1 Armor Division 1 Artillery Brigade 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Training Brigade 1 Helicopter Brigade 8 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Groups
MSDF	Basic Units Anti-submarine Surface-Ship Units (Mobile) Anti-submarine Surface-Ship Units (Regional) Submarine Units Minesweeping Units Land-based Anti-submarine Aircraft Units	4 Escort Flotillas 10 Divisions 6 Divisions 2 Flotillas 16 Squadrons
	Main Equipment Anti-submarine Surface Ships Submarine Combat Aircraft	Apx. 60 Ships 16 Submarines 220 Combat Aircraft
ASDF	Basic Units Aircraft Control and Warning Units Interceptor Units Support Fighter Units Air Reconnaissance Units Air Transport Units Early Warning Units High-Altitude Ground-to-Air Missile Units	28 Groups 10 Squadrons 3 Squadrons 1 Squadron 3 Squadrons 1 Squadron 6 Groups
	Main Equipment Combat Aircraft	Apx. 430 Aircraft

Adopted 29 October 1976.

LIST OF REFERENCES

Aichi, Kazoo, "Objections to Secretary Ozawa," *Bungei Shunju*, February 1995 (American Embassy, Tokyo, Japanese Magazine Review, January 1995)

_____, *Asia 1995 Yearbook* (Far East Economic Review, 1995)

Atsushi, Odawara, "No Tampering with the Brake on Military Expansion," *Japan Quarterly*, v32 n3 (July-Sept 1985)

Ball, Desmond, "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," *International Security*, v18 n3 (Winter 1993-94)

_____, "Beginning of a Solution: The Japan-U.S. Summit Agreement on Bases in Okinawa," *Ryukyu Shimpō*, Tokyo, Foreign Broadcast Information System (FBIS) - EAS-95-0100, (17 January 1995)

Bellows, Michael D. ed, *Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities* (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), 1994)

Blank, Stephen J., *The New Russia in the New Asia* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994)

Buss, Claude A., *The United States and the Philippines* (Stanford: AEI-Hoover Policy Studies, 1977)

_____, "China's New Model Army," *Economist*, v331 n7867 (June 11, 1994)

Cronin, Patrick M. and Green Michael J., *Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program* (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1994)

Curtis, Gerald L. ed., *The United States, Japan, and Asia* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1994)

_____, "Defense Capability Hollowing Out (Part 1): Distortions Resulting from Budget Retrenchment: No Money for Even Vehicle...; Shortages Reach 40 Percent," *Sankei*, 14 December 1994 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 21 December 1994)

_____, "Defense Facilities Administration Agency Policy Line: To Shoulder the Costs of U.S. Forces' Training, Will Make up Difference in Connection with Relocation of Place for Training to Iwo Jima: Argument over Collective Security Right Likely to Occur," *Tokyo*

Shimbum, 19 April 1995 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 21 April 1995)

Defense of Japan, 1983 (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1983)

Defense of Japan, 1992 (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1992)

Defense of Japan, 1994 (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1994)

Defense White Paper, 1993-1994 (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 1994)

Department Of Defense (DOD), *A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office [GPO], 1992)

DOD, Office of International Security Affairs, *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* (Washington: U.S. GPO, February 1995)

Dolan, Ronald E. ed., *Japan: A Country Study* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office [U.S. GPO], 1992)

Ebata, Kensuke, "Draft Proposal Edges Japan Toward Pacifism," *Jane's Defense Weekly* v22 n10 (10 September 1994): 3.

_____, "Hayakawa Will Head Fact-Finding Mission for PKO on Golan Heights," *Nihon Keizai*, 25 March 1995 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 30 March 1995)

Holcomb, James F. and Boll, Michael M., *Russia's New Doctrine: Two Views* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994)

Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS), *Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition* (Washington: U.S. GPO, 1995)

International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), *Military Balance 1994-1995*, (London: Brassey, 1994)

_____, "Japan and United States Agree to work together for Weapons Export Control: To Reinforce Application of Four Restrictions as well as Assisting Asian Countries in their Improving or Setting up Exports Control System: Periodic Talks will Start next Month," *Nihon Keizai*, 13 March 1995, (Daily Summary of Japanese Press: American Embassy,

Tokyo, 14 March 1995)

_____, "Japan, U.S. Beginning to 'Redefine ' Bilateral Security Arrangement," *Asahi*, 3 June 1995 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 10-12 June 1995)

_____, "Japan to Promote Security Dialogue with Asia: JDA Groping for Stability after Cold War: Multilateralism with 'Japan-U.S. ' Security Relationship as Axis," *Asahi*, Tokyo, 13 March 1995 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 14 March 1995)

_____, "Japan's Choices -- 50 Years after the End of World War II: Cold Peace (Part 3): Changing Nature of Japan-United States Intelligence Exchanges; To 'Bring together as One Perceptions of Unstable Elements'; Secrets Also Shared, Focusing on Possible Redefinition of Security Alliance," *Mainichi*, Tokyo, 14 March 1995, (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 23 March 1995)

_____, "Japan's Choices -- 50 Years after the End of World War II: Cold Peace (Part 4): U.S. Forces in Japan (USFJ) Now Standing at Crossroads," *Mainichi*, Tokyo 15 March 1995, (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 24 March 1995)

_____, "Japan's Choices -- 50 Years after the End of World War II: Cold Peace (Part 5): Logic of Redefining Security Arrangement: Overshadowed by Military Power Buildup and Economic Growth: 'China Threat Agrument' Rising without Seeing Actual Conditions," *Mainichi*, 15 March 1995, (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 25-27 March 1995) 7-8.

_____, "Japan's Choices -- 50 Years after the End of World War II: Cold Peace (Part 7): Under the Name of TMD: 'The Last Huge Weaponry Sales Battle of This Century'; Domestic Trading Houses and Makers Running About, " *Mainichi*, 18 March 1995 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 29 March 1995)

Kendell, Joseph P., *The Politics of Defense in Japan: Managing Internal and External Pressures* (New York: M.E.Sharpe, 1993)

Kim, Andrew H.N., "Japan and Peacekeeping Operations," *Military Review*, v74 n4 (April 1994)

Langdon, Frank C., *Japan's Foreign Policy* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1973)

Larson, Charles R. Adm USN, "Pacific Command's Cooperative Engagement: Advancing

U.S. Interests" *Military Review* v74 n4 (April 1994)

Livingston, Jon, Monroe, Joe and Oldfather, Felicia, *Postwar Japan: 1945 to the Present* (New York: Random House, 1973)

_____, "More on Defense Budget" *Kyodo* (25 July 1994) in *FBIS-EAS-94-142*, Daily Report 25 July 1994,

_____, "Murayama Wants to Scale Down U.S. Military," *Kyodo*, Tokyo, *FBIS-EAS-95-0100*, (17 January 1995)

_____, "Next Generation Fighter: JDA, Aircraft Manufactures to Develop Demonstration Model with Domestic Technologies, Aiming at 2008; Projecting Follow-on Model to ZReplace F-15," *Nihon Keizai*, 3 September 1994 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 3-6 September 1994)

_____, "'Non-Support' for Murayama Cabinet reaches 34 percent; First Reversal of 'Support' at 27 percent; 'No Leadership Any Political Partry'; Results of Mainichi Public Survey," *Mainichi* 15 March 1995, (American Embassy, Tokyo, Daily Summary of Japanese Press, 17 March 1995)

_____, "North Korea's Ballistic Missile Program," *North Korea: A Potential Time Bomb* (Surrey: Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report n2, 1994)

_____, "North Korea Takes the Money," *Economist*, v334 n7897 (January 14, 1995)

Nye, Joseph S. Jr., "American Security Strategy for East Asia and the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance," Speech given at Pacific Forum CSIS/JIIA Conference, San Francisco, 29 March 1995

Nye, Joseph S. Jr., Chalmers Johnson and E.B. Keehn, "'The U.S. in East Asia: Stay or Go?' Two Views on Security," *Foreign Affairs* v74 n4 (July/August 1995)

_____, "Okinawa Governor on Relocating Naha Naval Port," *Okinawa Times*, Naha, *FBIS-EAS-95-017* (24 January 1995)

Pyle, Kenneth B., *The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute [AEI], 1992)

Roy, Denny, "Hegemon on the Horizon?: China's Threat to East Asian Security," *International Security*, v19 n1 (Summer 1994)

Sasaki, Takeshi, "Agenda for the Post-LDP Era," *Japan Review of International Affairs*, (Fall 1994)

Schonberger, Howard B., *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* (Kent: Kent State, 1989)

_____, "Self Defense Forces (SDF) Emerges from the Cradle," *Nikkei Business*, 31 October 1994 (Japanese Magazine Review, American Embassy, Tokyo, November 1994)

Shishlevskiy, Valentin, "China's Defense Policy: Redefining Security Interests & Rewriting Military Doctrines," *Asian Defense Journal* (February 1995)

Smith, Charles, "Honeymoon's End: Prime Minister Murayama Suddenly Looks Vulnerable," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (13 October 1994)

Smith, Charles, "Problem Child: Doubts Cloud Birth of New Opposition Grouping," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (22 December 1994)

Smith, Charles, "Strange Bedfellows: Expediency Wins Out over Ideology in Coalition Politics," *Far East Economic Review*, (14 July 1994)

Smith, Charles, "Western Front: Defence Strategists Plan for a Post Cold-War World," *Far East Economic Review*, v157 n30 (July 28, 1994)

Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition (Washington: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1995)

Tai Ming Cheung, "China's Buying Spree: Russia Up to Peking's Weaponry," *Far East Economic Review*, v156 n27 (July 8, 1993)

_____, "Urging 'Bureaucrats' to Stand Up; Fulfill Your Real Duty: Do Not Roughshod over Politics," *Nihon Keizai*, 14 March 1995 (American Embassy, Daily Summary of Japanese Press, 16 March 1995)

Urusov, Mikhail, "Russia is Arming China," *Moscow News*, n40 (October 7, 1994)

_____, "U.S.' Asia Policy: Powerfully Pushing Ahead with Security Dialogue; U.S. Aiming to Ease Tensions with Confidence Building Measures as Leverage: Politico-Economic Approach Somewhat Pragmatic; Repairing Relations with China is Key," *Shimbun*, 21 July 1995 (Daily Summary of Japanese Press, American Embassy, Tokyo, 29 July 1995)

Vogel, Ezra F., "Japanese-American Relations After the Cold War," *Daedalus*, v121 n4 (Fall 1992)

Wanner, Barbara, "Japan Explores Restructuring its Self-Defense Capabilities," *Japan Economic Institute Report* (Washington: Japan Economic Institute, 38A, 7 October 1994)

White House, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, (Washington: U.S. GPO, February 1995)

Wilborn, Thomas L., *Japan's Self-Defense Forces: What Dangers to Northeast Asia?* (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994)

Williams, Daniel, "Rebuilding Military Ties to Tokyo: 'Nye Initiative' Launched to Address Post-Cold War Security Concerns," *Washington Post*, (19 February 1995)

Yoshida, Shigeru, *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis* (Cambridge: Riverside, 1962)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Allison, John M., *Ambassador from the Prairie or Allison Wonderland* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1973)

Blank, Stephen J., *Russian Policy and the Korean Crisis*, (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1994)

Brown, Eugene, "Japanese Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Threat Perceptions and Strategic Options," *Asian Survey*, v34 n5 (May 1994)

_____, "Budget Reduction Affects U.S. Forces in Japan" *Kyodo* (8 August 1994) in *FBIS-EAS-94-152*, Daily Report 8 August 1994.

Chinworth, Micheal W., *Inside Japan's Defense: Technology, Economics and Strategy* (New York: Brassey, 1992)

Cossa, Ralph, et al, *The Japan-U.S. Alliance and Security Regimes in East Asia: A Workshop Report* (Tokyo: The Institute for Nternational Policy Studies & The Center for Naval Analyses, January 1995)

Defense of Japan, 1982 (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1982)

Defense of Japan, 1990 (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1990)

Department of Defense(DOD), *National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy of Flexoble and Selective Engagement*, (Washington: U.S. GPO, February 1995)

Endicott, John E., *Japan's Nuclear Option: Political, Technical and Strategic Factors* (New York: Praeger, 1975)

Epstein, William, *The Last Chance: Nuclear Proliferation and Arms Control* (New York: Free Press, 1976)

Freedberg, Aaron L., "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia" *International Security*, v18 n3 (Winter 1993/1994)

Fukuyama, Francis, et al., *The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship After the Cold War* (Santa Monica: RAND [MR-283-USDP], 1993)

Gill, R. Bates, *The Challenge of Chinese Arms Proliferation: U.S. Policy for the 1990s* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 31 August 1993)

Godwin, Paul and Schulz, John J., "Arming the Dragon for the 21st Century: China's Defense Modernization Program?" *Arms Control Today* (December 1993)

Hall, Ivan P., "Japan's Asia Card" *The National Interest*, (Winter 1994/1995)

Harries, Meirion and Susie, *Sheathing the Sword: The Demilitarisation of Japan* (New York: MacMillan, 1987)

Hayes, Louis D., *Introduction to Japanese Politics* (New York: Paragon House, 1992)

Holland, Harrison M., *Managing Defense: Japan's Dilemma* (New York: University Press of America, 1988)

House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Missile Proliferation: The Need for Controls (Missile Technology Control Regime)*, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 1989

Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Nuclear Policy of Government of Japan* (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs [M.O.F.A.], 1 February 1994)

Kajima, Morinosuke, *Modern Japan's Foreign Policy* (Rutland: Charles E. Tuttle, 1969)

Kataoka, Tetsuya & Myers, Ramon H., *Defending an Economic Superpower: Reassessing the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance* (San Francisco: Westview, 1989)

Kawamura, Sumihiko Kawamura (Rear Adm JMSDF, Ret), *Japan's Fleet Structure in a changed Environment* (Shephard Conferences: Sea Power, 1994)

Kristof, Nicholas D., "The Rise of China" *Foreign Affairs* v72 n5 November/December 1993

Langer, William L., ed., *An Encyclopedia of World History* 5th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1980)

Levin, Norman D., et al., *The Wary Warriors: Future Directions in Japanese Security Policies* MR-101-AF (Santa Monica: RAND, 1993)

Maekawa, Kiyoshi, "The Road to a New NDPO; Japan's Defense, Standing at a Turning Point" *Seiron* (June 1994) trans in *FBIS-EAS-94-151*, Daily Report 5 August 1994.

McIntoch, Malcolm, *Japan Re-armed* (New York: St. Martin's, 1986)

Mochizuki, Mike, et al, *Japan and the United States: Troubled Partners in a Changing World* (Washington: Brassey's, 1991)

Olsen, Edward A., *U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprcity: A Neo-Internationalist View* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1985)

_____, "Panel Urges 'Leaner', Active Defense Forces" *Kyodo* (12 August 1994) in *FBIS-EAS-94-156*, Daily Report 12 August 1994.

_____, *Provisional Verbatim Minutes of the Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Treaty of Peace with Japan* (Tokyo: Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MOFA], 1951)

Reischauer, Edwin O., *Japan: The Story of a Nation* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990)

Samuels, Richard J., *"Rich Nation, Strong Army" National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1994)

Schaller, Michael, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia* (New York: Oxford, 1985)

Sigal, Leon V., *Fighting to the Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1988)

Symington, Struat, SenateCommittee on Foreign Relations, *United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad, Part Five Japan and Okinawa* 91st Congress, 2nd Session, 1970

Taylor, Trevor, ed., *The Defence Trade: Demand, Supply and Control, The Security Challenges for Japan and Europe in a Post-Cold War World Vol 3* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994)

Wanner, Barbara, "Defense White Paper Warns Against Precipitous Downsizing," *Japan Economic Institute Report* (Washington: Japan Economic Institute, 29B, 29 July 1994)

Weinstein, Martin E., *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968* (New York: Columbia, 1971)

Wilborn, Thomas L., *Security Cooperation with China: Analysis and a Proposal* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 25 November 1994)

Yoshitsu, Michael M., *Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement* (New York: Columbia, 1983)

Ziegler, Charles E., "Russia in the Asia Pacific: A Major Power or Minor Participant?" *Asian Survey* v34 n6 (June 1994)

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

		No. Copies
1.	Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22304-6145	2
2.	Library Code 013 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943-5101	2
3.	Dr. Frank M. Teti Chairman, National Security Affairs (NS/Tt) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	1
4.	Dr. Claude A. Buss National Security Affairs (NS/Bx) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	5
5.	Dr. Edward A. Olsen National Security Affairs (NS/Os) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	1
6.	Dr. John Arquilla National Security Affairs (NS/Ar) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943	1
7.	John Y. Rhee Monterey Institute of International Studies 425 Van Buren Street Monterey, CA 93940	1

- | | | |
|-----|--|---|
| 8. | LTC Robin H. Sakoda, USA
Country Director for Japan
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
International Security Affairs
Asia and Pacific Affairs
The Pentagon, Room 4C840
Washington, DC 20350 | 1 |
| | | |
| 9. | LCDR Diane B.J.W. Seattris, USN
East Asia & Pacific Politico-Military Branch
N522D, The Pentagon, Room 4E475
Office of The Chief of Naval Operations
Washington, DC 20350 | 1 |
| | | |
| 10. | James A. McVerry
Office of Japanese Affairs (EAP/J)
Department of State
Washington, DC 20520 | 1 |
| | | |
| 11. | LT Ann Y. Rhie, USN
3846 S. 9th Road
Arlington, VA 22204 | 1 |
| | | |
| 12. | LT John M. Kubera, USN
143 Loomis Street
Nanticoke, PA 18634 | 2 |